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ABSTRACT 
 
Stimulating economic development and growth has been difficult in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
In this three-essay dissertation, I examine and assess two strategies—market-based risk 
management through hedging, and growth through aid—that could potentially facilitate growth 
in SSA. 
  Since many SSA countries derive a considerable portion of their total export revenues 
and foreign exchange from the exports to highly volatile commodity markets, risk management 
strategies are viewed as viable methods to reduce the negative effects of risk on development and 
growth (Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako and Grynberg, 2007). Here I investigate the usefulness of 
futures markets for hedging price, production and hence, revenue risk in the cocoa market, a 
commodity particularly important to SSA countries such as Ghana, La Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), 
Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and Cameroon.  An ability to hedge commodity-market volatility 
reduces terms-of-trade risk, leading to a more effective allocation of resources (Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995). 
 The effectiveness of aid in stimulating growth is controversial (Bruckner, 2011; Naito, 
2010; Leeson, 2008; Collier, 2007 and Easterly, 2006). Highly diverse economic situations, 
economic programs, and political instability make it difficult to identify when aid will have a 
positive effect on growth.  I examine factors that stimulate economic growth in SSA using recent 
data, while addressing endogeneity problems that typically plague the aid-growth relationship. In 
particular, I focus on the relationship between political stability, foreign aid and growth because 
although political stability is a pertinent factor affecting growth in SSA, the empirical literature 
has largely ignored its influence until very recently. The existing literature concludes that good 
macroeconomic policy is the crucial factor in determining efficacy of aid in stimulating growth,  
ii 
basing this conclusion on Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) finding of a significant aid-policy effect. 
 Similar to Islam (2005), I challenge the existing view that good policy is sufficient to 
make aid work. Specifically, I investigate whether political stability is a more pertinent 
determinant of the aid-growth relationship in SSA. The aid literature has also not critically 
evaluated the validity (exogeneity and strength) of the instruments used to correct endogeneity 
bias in aid-growth regressions. Following Deaton (2008), I evaluate the applicability of 
instrumental variable techniques to the estimation of the aid-growth regressions for SSA. 
 The dissertation consists of three essays. Essay 1 is concerned with the role of political 
stability in the use of aid as a growth strategy. It characterizes the economic relationship between 
aid and growth and determines how political stability affects the aid-growth relation in SSA. 
Appropriate econometric procedures are used to mitigate endogeneity bias due to unobserved, 
time-invariant country-specific effects and to simultaneity in the aid-growth regression.  
 Essays 2 and 3 focus on the use of market based-strategies to minimize market risk in 
order to enhance growth. Essay 2 determines whether cocoa futures markets are biased and 
inefficient either in the long or short run using five and two-month cocoa maturities. The paper 
also establishes if any short-run bias in the futures forecast of cash prices is due to a risk 
premium or to informational inefficiency. The presence of a risk premium will result in biased 
futures forecasts of subsequent periods’ spot prices. The absence of a risk premium in a futures 
market is thus a favorable condition for using the futures market to manage commodity market 
risk.  Hedging is feasible if a risk premium exists but it may not be practical if returns are low. 
Finally Essay 3 investigates if hedging revenue risk is utility improving for a sovereign 
cocoa exporter like Ghana using a five month pre-harvest to harvest hedge. This is done by 
determining if optimal hedge ratios for cocoa exporter remain positive for a range of relevant 
iii 
risk parameters after transactions costs are incorporated into the cocoa exporter's utility 
maximization problem.  The presence of utility-enhancing hedging may stimulate market returns 
and create an environment conducive to growth and development.  
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1.0 SUMMARY  
 Significant ambiguity still surrounds the aid-growth relationship despite fifty years of 
research on the subject. For the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a possible reason for the lack 
of consensus is that until recently the influence of political stability on the aid-growth 
relationship had been largely ignored despite its relevance for the region. Further, although 
overlooked by the literature, the Instrumental Variable (IV) technique, the preferred treatment 
method of endogeneity in aid-growth relationships, may be ineffective in eliminating 
endogeneity bias because typical instruments for aid are neither sufficiently exogenous nor 
strong. Using a dataset of 31 SSA countries from 1984-2007, we re-visit the question of whether 
aid can spur growth in SSA using first-differencing (FD) to eliminate unobserved-effects 
endogeneity while focusing on the role of political stability on the aid-growth relationship in 
SSA. Results suggest aid promotes growth conditional on political stability in SSA and that First 
Differencing (FD) eliminates a substantial amount of the endogeneity bias. Our results 
demonstrate the pertinence of a stable political environment for attaining the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) for SSA countries since these goals inherently assume that aid can 
promote growth. 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite repeated warnings by economists of its futility, the developed world still provides 
substantial aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to spur economic growth (Leeson, 2008 and Arndt, 
Jones and Tarp, 2010). SSA has absorbed almost one trillion nominal aid dollars over the last 
fifty years but the growth record has been unimpressive (Mayo, 2009 and Easterly, 2006). The 
insistence of developed countries to bestow aid on SSA is not so confounding if one considers 
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that ambiguity still surrounds the effect of foreign aid on growth (Naito, 2010 and Bruckner, 
2011).  In particular, estimation of the aid-growth relationship is fraught with different kinds of 
endogeneity problems (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 and Deaton, 2008). Further, since SSA has 
been racked by political instability, a question emerges about the effect of political stability on 
the aid-growth relationship in the region. 
 Given the uncertainty about the effect of aid on growth, and the possible consequences of 
political stability on the aid-growth relationship, this paper seeks to: (1) empirically determine if 
aid and growth are related using recent SSA data, and (2) identify the effects of political stability 
on the aid-growth relationship in SSA after accounting for possible endogeneity bias. 
 The article contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it focuses on the SSA 
region and employs recent data in estimating the effect of political stability on the aid-growth 
relationship. Second, it uses a dependable measure of political stability constructed with the 
Political Risk Service (PRS)’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset to identify the 
effect of political stability on the aid-growth relationship in SSA. Finally the possibility of 
endogeneity bias is addressed; the current literature treatment of endogeneity with IV is 
criticized while FD is justified and employed in estimating the aid-growth regression. Aid is 
found to be positively and significantly related to growth in SSA conditional on political stability 
after minimizing endogeneity bias. This result confirms Islam’s (2005) finding that aid promotes 
growth in stable but not in unstable LDCs.  
 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
There are valid theoretical arguments as to why the effect of aid on growth might be 
positive, negative, linear, nonlinear or even ambiguous (Minoiua, and Reddyb, 2010; Easterly, 
2006 and Hansen and Tarp, 2001). On one hand, “Gap theory” contends that aid promotes 
growth by augmenting the investment and foreign exchange needed for production and growth 
(Chenery and Strout, 1966).  On the other hand, countries that receive aid might consume it, 
leading to aid-dependence (Bauer, 1984, 1991and 2000; Mayo, 2009; Rajan, and Subramanian, 
2011 and Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010).  Clearly, aid might hurt or promote growth, so the effect 
of aid on growth remains an empirical question (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 and Bruckner, 
2011). Comprehending the exact relationship between aid and growth is, however, crucial to 
SSA countries and donors as they seek to realize the UN's Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs) which inherently posit that aid is growth-promoting (see the Appendix A at the end of 
the dissertation for details of the eight MDGs). The stated aim of the MDGs is to halve severe 
$1/day poverty between 1990 and 2015 using aid as one strategy (Sachs, 2005 and Collier, 2007) 
so it’s vital to ascertain with a  reasonable degree of confidence how aid affects growth in SSA. 
 Entangled in the debate on how aid affects growth are differences in the structure of the 
economic model, the context under which aid is effective, the econometric procedures employed 
and the data used. In particular, the effect of aid on growth is likely to be context-specific 
therefore identifying the salient features of the context has received a lot of attention in the 
literature. Burnside and Dollar (2000) (henceforth BD (2000)) identified good macroeconomic 
policy as the salient contextual condition for aid to promote growth. They found that the aid-
growth relation is positive for countries that maintain sound economic policies but negative for 
countries with inappropriate policies, basing their result on a positive and significant interaction 
term involving aid and policy. BD (2000) included a dummy for SSA which proved to be 
negative and significant in aid-growth regressions, indicating that the aid-growth effect may be 
different for SSA. This point is noteworthy as effective policy might be insufficient to guarantee 
the efficacy of aid in promoting growth in SSA. Not surprisingly, the contention that aid 
promotes growth given good policy has been successfully challenged in the literature. For 
example, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) showed that the positive aid effect given good 
policy disappears when either more time series data or different countries are used in the data set. 
In contrast, Islam (2005) finds that the aid-growth relationship must be conditioned on political 
stability, not macroeconomic policy as political stability is the more pertinent determinant of the 
efficacy of aid in stimulating growth.  
 Like Islam (2005), our objective is to investigate whether political stability influences the 
aid-growth relationship. However, we limit our dataset to SSA because this is our region of 
interest and because SSA appears to experience relatively high levels of instability. We 
investigate the effect of political stability on the aid-growth relationship and address two types of 
endogeneity also identified by Hansen and Tarp (2001): (i) simultaneity (caused by feedback 
from growth to aid) and (ii) unobserved-effects endogeneity caused by correlation between 
latent, time-invariant (and or time-varying) country-specific effects in the error matrix and the 
matrix of right hand side variables. Both types of endogeneity can cause bias in OLS estimation 
of aid-growth relationships so their deleterious effects need to be properly mitigated.  
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While the aid-growth literature is only now focusing on reducing bias due to unobserved 
effect endogeneity, it abounds with attempts to control simultaneity bias using IV. There is 
however limited literature that focuses on evaluating whether the typical instruments for aid used 
in IV estimation of aid-growth regressions such as population satisfy the exogeneity and strength 
criteria defined for valid instrumental variables analysis (Deaton, 2008). This research will help 
close that literature gap. For example, population may be endogenous in the growth equation for 
SSA countries; this implies that in contrast to the IV treatment of the endogeneity of aid by Islam 
(2005), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and majority of the aid literature, typical instruments for aid 
may actually be invalid instruments for aid. Colonial legacy (Islam 2005) and rainfall (Bruckner, 
2001), however, may be argued to be exogenous instruments for aid since they are not 
determined by contemporaneous economic performance. However, they are not excludable; that 
is, they belong to the true model and should enter the growth equation as explanatory variables 
and should not be used as instruments. Finally, except for Deaton (2008) the literature has not 
focused on evaluating the “strength” of instrument for aid in aid-growth regressions. 
 
1.3 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 The model used in this paper is a modified version of Islam’s (2005) empirical aid-
growth model which was derived from Solow’s (1956) theoretical growth model and is standard 
in the aid-growth literature. Following Islam (2005), aid is hypothesized to affect growth through 
its effect on savings and investment.  Political stability affects the aid-growth link through its 
effect on the ability of a nation’s citizens to accumulate capital, save, invest and innovate 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2011). In particular a stable political environment can lead to effective 
economic policies and correct investment decisions both of which can spur growth. In a stable 
political environment, aid is then just new capital and should logically contribute to growth 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2001). The effects of political stability on the aid-growth relationship can thus 
be captured in the empirical model by the interaction between political stability and aid. The 
empirical growth model employed is presented in (1)-(3) and used to investigate the relationship 
between economic growth and foreign aid, as well as the effects of political stability on the aid-
growth relationship in SSA.  
(1) GROWTH it    =   γo      +    γ AID  AID  t-1   +    γ AIDSQ AID
2 
t-1      +   γ AIDPS  AIDPS t-1      
                                +     γ PS PS t-1            +      γ SQPS PS
2
 t-1      +     Zit `γ Z        +     ε it 
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(2)  ε it         =   ε i  +      ν it 
(3)    ν it      ~   N (0, σ
2 ) 
GROWTH is GDP per capita growth, AID, is foreign aid or Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), AID
2 
is the square of AID, PS is political stability, PS
2
 is the square of political stability, 
AIDPS is the interactions of PS with AID, and 0 is the overall constant. The vector Z includes 
variables that control for initial conditions affecting growth, and recent literature provides 
guidance for their selection (Islam, 2005).  Z contains variables such as initial level of income 
(represented by initial GDP or IGDP), standard deviation of aid (STAID), level of education 
(PRIM), quality of institutions (represented by international country risk guide (ICRG)’s quality 
of bureaucracy and democratic accountability variables, BQUAL and DACC), government 
consumption as a portion of GDP (GCONS), and the money supply as proportion of GDP or 
(M2).  Different from Islam (2005) but consistent with Rajan, and Subramanian (2011), Arndt, 
Jones and Tarp (2010) and Minoiua and Reddyb (2010), we explicitly specify the unobserved 
effects which are likely correlated with the explanatory variables in the error term. Thus, εit is a 
composite error consisting of a country-specific component, εi and an iid error term,  
νit which has variance σ.
2
 We include a set of time dummies, one for each four-year period, to 
account for potential cyclical effects such as downturns in the world economy that may affect the 
aid-growth relationship. 
  The sign of the relationship between aid and growth remains an empirical question and 
may depend on the countries examined (Easterly, 2003). Political stability is expected to 
positively promote growth. While quality of institutions, level of education and the money 
supply variables are expected to be positively related to growth, government consumption and 
the standard deviation of aid are expected to be negatively correlated with growth. Initial GDP 
will also likely reduce growth as dictated by conditional convergence (Barro, 1996). Following 
Easterly, Levine, and Dollar (2004) the square of aid is also included as a regressor in the growth 
equation to account for other possible types of non-linearity.  
 
1.4 DATA DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 The aid data are from SourceOECD while the political stability data are from the Political 
Risk Service (PRS) and are described in detail later in the paper. Aid as used here refers to 
Oversees Development Assistance (ODA) typically given to poorer countries by richer donors 
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and is exclusive of non-ODA aid. According to the development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there are two main 
types of ODA aid; multilateral and bilateral aid. About 30% of ODA aid is multi-lateral aid and 
the remaining 70% is bilateral aid. Total ODA is used in this research. ODA donor countries all 
belong to the OECD and together donate about 80% of total worldwide aid.  China and India 
have recently become significant donors together accounting for more than 10% of total current 
aid but such aid is not ODA aid and is not considered in this research. Private organizations 
provide 10% of worldwide aid (OECD).  
 The growth data and the remainder of the data are from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, the Penn World Tables, and the World Banks’ Africa 
Database CD. The data come from 31 SSA countries for which data were available (see Table 
1.1 for a list), range from 1984 to 2007 and cover six four-year periods (i.e. 1984-1987 to 2004-
2007). Apart from possible sample selection bias that may emerge since not all SSA countries 
are included in the dataset, there are also missing observations leading to an unbalanced panel.  
 It is also plausible that countries with worse institutions (or more likely to be afflicted by 
war) are less likely to have good quality data so they are not part of the sample. Such countries 
are perhaps also more likely to have a zero aid-growth relationship; so their absence would bias 
OLS results upward. Note, however, that the included SSA countries are spread within the SSA 
region and there is no evidence of a well-defined data generating process by which the SSA 
countries were picked therefore sample selection bias is unlikely to be too severe. With regards 
to missing data, of the 186 observations, 90 % of the data have complete sets of observations so 
the missing data problem will have limited consequence in OLS estimation even if more data are 
lost through lagging or first differencing.  
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Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Mean 
(SD)
 Min / 
Max
Growth in per cap GDP (GROWTH)
Based on real GDP per capita in constant US 
dollars.
a
0.400 
(4.76)
-14.08 
(32.13)
Initial GDP (IGDP) * $ 100 000 000
Real GDP per capita in the last year preceding 
the period for which the growth rate is 
calculated.
a
688.93  
(937.94)
56.52 
(4599.0)
Aid (AID)
Net Oversees Development Assistance (ODA) 
disbursements as a percentage of GDP.
b&c
0.19 
(0.25)
0.001 
(1.70)
Primary Schooling (PRIM) Years of primary education.
a
6.16 
(0.71)
4.00 
(8.00)
Financial Depth (M2)
Money and quasi-money (M2) as a percentage 
of GDP. 
a
25.03 
(35.04)
-8.10 
(368.4)
Life Expectancy (LE) Life expectancy at birth, total (years).
a
46.24 
(12.49)
10.00 
(63. 06)
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Table 1.1 Continued 
Political Stabilty (PS)
This is an assessment both of the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office. 
f
6.8130 
(2.4091)
1.70 
(10.700)
Government Consumption 
(GCONS)
Gov consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. 
a
15.3340 
(6.454)
5.9  
(50.1)
Time Dummies
Each Dummy takes a value of  1 for 
particular period and 0 otherwise. The six 4-
year time periods start from 1984-1987 and 
end with 2004-2007. 
e
0.000  
(1.000)
Standard Deviation of AID Square root of the variance of AID
1.52 
(0.0002)
0.17 
(0.200)
 
Variable  Description
Mean 
(SD)
 Min 
(Max)
Investment profile (INVPROF)
Assessment of factors affecting risk to 
investment not covered by other political risk 
components. Ranges from 0-12.  12 is very 
low risk and  0 is high risk. 
f
5.779 
(2.074)
0.500 
(10.80)
Democratic Accountability (DACC)
This is a measure of how responsive 
government is to its people.  The minimum is 0 
and represents the highest risk.  The maxmum is 
6 and represents lowest risk. 
f
2.605 
(1.124 )
0.200 
(5.60)
Bureaucratic Quality (BQUAL)
This is a measure of the quality of the 
bureaucracy.  Ranges from 0-4 with 4 being the 
lowest  risk.
f
1.4130 
(1.025)
0.000 
(4.00)
 
 
Sources. 
a 
World Development Indicators; 
b
OECD-DAC's online SourceOECD database; 
c 
World 
Bank's Africa Database; 
e 
Constructed variable; 
f 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of 
Political Risk Services (PRS). 
 
Note: The SAA countries in the analysis include: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, 
Congo DR, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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 Table 1.1 on the previous page contains definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
based on six four-year observations and provides detailed information about data sources and 
transformations of key variables used in the growth regressions in (1-3). The conversion of the 
annual data into four year periods is consistent with the time it takes for aid to manifest into 
growth (Moreira, 2005 and Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004). Correlations between the 
main explanatory variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1.2 on the next page. The 
correlations between the variables are low, typically less than 0.4, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not severe and should not distort statistical inference. Aid is negatively 
correlated to political stability and initial GDP, respectively (-0.19) and (-0.24), implying aid is 
not systematically allocated to politically stable countries.   
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Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix of Selected Explanatory Variables 
 
 
IGDP Aid POL PS PRIM M2 BQUAL DACC LE GCONS INVPROF LANDL
IGDP 1
AID -0.197 1
POL -0.064 0.364 1
PS -0.01 -0.249 0.083 1
PRIM 0.032 0.207 -0.03 0.091 1
M2  0.304 0.13 0.199 -0.108 0.422 1
BQUAL 0.369 -0.24 0.003 0.004 -0.098 0.142 1
DACC 0.116 -0.173 -0.02 0.308 -0.026 -0.191 0.205 1
LE -0.055 0.132 -0.09 -0.237 0.2141 0.105 0.328 -0.0638 1
GCONS 0.061 0.111 0.229 -0.319 -0.305 0.168 -0.0262 -0.0868 -0.14 1
INVPROF 0.053 -0.164 0.179 0.7 0.0915 -0.056 0.1042 0.482 -0.29 -0.208 1
LANDL 0.356 -0.326 -0.07 0.05 -0.292 0.075 0.444 -0.0056 0.243 -0.225 0.034 1   
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 Figure 1.1 provides a plot of the measure of political stability (PS) against growth 
rates. The PS measure is an assessment of the quality of governance, the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared program (s) and its ability to stay in office. The rating is 
the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a 
minimum score of zero points. The subcomponents of the PS measure are government 
unity, legislative strength and popular support. For each subcomponent, a score of four 
points equates to very low risk and a score of zero points to very high risk. As a 
consequence of how its subcomponents are defined, a PS score of twelve points equates 
to very low risk (stable) and zero points to very high risk (unstable).  
 The PS measure was constructed using data from PRS’s International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset which covers 182 countries from 1980-2008 and is widely 
considered by political science researchers as the most reliable and comprehensive data 
on political stability available. The PS measure makes sense for the principal argument of 
this paper since good governance, and a lack of conflict reflected in government unity, 
legislative strength and popular support contributes to growth by making aid more 
effective. The sub-components of the PS capture the milder forms of political stability 
which likely affect the aid-growth relationship even in the absence of catastrophic events 
such as wars making the PS measure the best one for our purposes. Further, note that 
although the ICRG data have been widely used in the literature on corruption and 
governance, (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, (1997)) its use is not as 
widespread in the aid and growth literature. The popularity of the ICRG data have 
however, increased recently as Knack and Keefer (2001) and Brautigam and Knack 
(2004) both employed PRS’s ICRG data to study the impacts of aid on institutions and 
governance in SSA while Rajan and Subramanian (2008), Arnd et al (2010), and Minoiu 
and Reddy (2010) employ the measure in aid-growth regressions. These authors reported 
that the political stability measures provided meaningful and intuitive findings. It is also 
noteworthy that the PRS data accurately capture changes in historical political stability 
among countries and over time as will be explained. Further, other more "recent" 
governance indicators e.g. Mo Ibrahim's index of governance provide rankings of 
countries which are consistent with the political stability measure used in this study 
providing some comfort that our measure is accurate. A final attribute of the PRS’s ICRG 
11 
  
dataset is that it provides the widest range of stability data both in terms of the number of 
SSA countries available and years covered and uses a well-documented and reliable 
method where country experts rate countries over time and is thus a perfect fit for our 
purposes.  It is possible to have slight differences in PS scores for particular countries say 
for Liberia relative to Ghana and South Africa in terms of ex post accuracy of forecast 
which may reflect the bias of the experts measuring the stability conditions.  However 
such biases are likely to be time-invariant and will disappear when FD estimation is 
employed as was done in this paper. 
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Figure 1.1 Growth versus Political Stability, all SSA Countries, 1984-2007 
 
Data Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) 
 
Figure 1.2 Political Stability for the Most Stable SSA Countries, 1984-2007 
 
Data Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) 
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Figure 1.3. Political Stability for the Least Stable SSA Countries, 1984-2007 
 
Data Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) 
 
Figure 1.4. Political Stability for SSA Countries, 2004-2007 
 
 
Data Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) 
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Figure 1.5. Political Stability for SSA Countries, 1996-1999 
 
 
Data Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) 
 
Figures 1.2-1.5 shows that the measure of PS is a credible measure of political 
conditions. For each country, there is variation in the PS measure over time, and for each 
period, there is variation across countries in the PS measure. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 
demonstrate that there is variation over time in the measure of PS not only for the most 
stable SSA countries like Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania, who have average PS 
values greater than 6.8 (the mean PS), but also for the least stable SSA countries like 
Congo (DRC), Somalia and Liberia for which average PS is less than 6.8 or the mean PS. 
For both the least stable and the most stable set of countries (Figure 1.2 and 1.3), the high 
PS numbers are concentrated at the end of the data range, while the opposite holds true 
for the low PS numbers. This indicates a general rise in political stability of the SSA 
region more recently for the least stable countries and is consistent with observation. 
Further, the PS index values appear to correspond to perceptions of the political situation 
for the SSA countries over time. For example, Liberia has higher PS score for 2003-2007 
than for 1996-1999, when it was still plagued by conflict and uncertainty. Figures 1.4 and 
1.5 illustrate that for each year there is heterogeneity in the score of PS for SSA 
countries. Visual inspection of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 reveals that for the countries that are 
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neither the least stable nor the most unstable, political stability has declined from 1999-
2007, but only very slightly.  
 
 
1.5 METHODS 
 The empirical growth model in (1) is applied to thirty-one SSA countries from 
1984-2007. Before estimating (1), the annual data were converted to four-year averages, 
because one-year intervals are too short to capture growth rates (Deaton, 2008).   
 The possibility that endogeneity bias may arise from different sources 
(simultaneity or unobserved effects), the small size of our sample, and the lack of valid 
instruments for the potentially endogenous aid and political stability variables posed 
peculiar econometric challenges for the estimation of the growth equation. A small 
sample size typically causes problems in estimation of the aid-growth relation because 
the traditional IV estimation techniques used to correct for endogeneity bias such as two-
stage least square (2SLS) produce inconsistent estimates when the sample size is small 
(Woolridge, 2002). Further, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity have low power 
in finite samples and may not detect endogeneity bias even when it is present. Even when 
the number of observations is sufficient, which would normally make traditional IV 
estimates consistent, traditional IV-type regressions are of little use in correcting 
endogeneity bias specifically in aid-growth regressions (Deaton, 2008). This is because in 
the context of SSA, none of the “standard” instruments for aid in the literature such as 
population (see BD, 2000 and Islam, 2005), and primary exports (see Bruckner, 2011) 
satisfies a major requirement for instrument validity: zero correlation between the 
instrument and the error term (exogeneity). 
 The aid-growth literature has paid even less attention to evaluating whether the 
“standard” set of instruments for aid is sufficiently strong. This may be because most of 
the significant contributions to the aid literature occurred in the twentieth century while 
the literature on weak instrument (see Stock and Yogo (2005)) emerged more recently. 
Further, when instruments are weak, IV estimation is inconsistent (Bound, Jaegger and 
Baker, 1993). We therefore drop instrumental variable (IV) analysis as a strategy for 
mitigating simultaneity bias.  
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 Unobserved effects can be either time-varying or time invariant. Latent and time-
invariant variables such as cultural norms and historical tensions that affect growth also 
affect aid, political stability and policy, so that unobserved effects may account for a 
considerable portion of the total endogeneity bias. Time-invariant unobserved effects can 
be removed by first differencing (FD). If such a strategy eliminates endogeneity bias we 
should notice corrected signs and stronger statistical significance of coefficients and 
better fit of the FD model relative to OLS. Further, we lag the endogenous variables so 
that they are predetermined in the aid equation to reduce the possibility of simultaneity.  
The structure of the first difference (FD) formulation of the OLS regressions in (1) – (3) 
are shown in (4) - (6) 
 
(4) 
  
(5)     
(6)  
 The observant reader will notice that as it stand the structure of (4) - (6) does 
provide detailed information about the time relationships in the data and makes the point 
that FD removes latent time invariant country-specific effects. However these equations 
(4) - (6) do not automatically account for possible bias due to unobserved but time-
varying country-specific effects; a matter we take up again later in the paper. 
 Given sufficient data, GMM is the optimal estimation method because it treats 
both unobserved endogeneity and simultaneity endogeneity (Hansen and Tarp, 2001). 
However, although we did perform such GMM estimations in previous versions of this 
paper we do not rely on results of the GMM dynamic panel model because it is likely 
fraught with finite sample bias since our dataset is small. Our current strategy of lagging 
AID, PS and AIDPS and estimating by FD eliminates all the unobserved endogeneity and 
is the correct estimation method. Fixed-Effects (FE) is not applicable here, because the 
data is not strictly exogenous. Residual simultaneity may persist however despite lagging 
PS, AID and AIDPS.   Islam (2005) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) treat simultaneity 
with IV and find no significant simultaneity bias  since estimates of aid are the same as 
OLS in magnitude but Aguir (2011) using rainfall and primary exports as instruments for 
2
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aid concludes that simultaneity biases his estimates upwards in IV estimation. In 
comparison, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgard and Hansen (2003) both use GMM and 
find contrasting results. While the former notes differences between GMM and OLS 
estimates, the latter does not find any differences so the controversy about the effect of 
endogeneity (direction and size) persists in the literature.  
  
1.6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 The empirical strategy was executed to (i) identify and quantify the effect of 
foreign aid on growth in SSA, (ii) to determine if political stability influences the aid-
growth relationship, and (iii) to address any endogeneity problems that emerge. The main 
results of estimation of the growth relationships (1) are presented in Table 1.3. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3 display results of estimation of equation (1) 
respectively by OLS, and FD. In contrast, columns 3 and 4 contain the same regressions 
in columns 1 and 2 but with PS dropped to evaluate how important the influence of 
political stability is to the aid-growth relationship. Finally note that AIDt-1, PSt-1 and 
AIDPSt-1 are lagged in the FD estimations (columns 2 and 4) but not in the OLS 
regressions (columns 1 and 3). This means for the FD estimations (but not the OLS 
regressions), AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1 are pre-determined in the growth regression so 
there is little simultaneity bias. OLS estimation was performed with both lagged and 
contemporaneous aid, political stability and their interactions (AIDt, PSt and AIDPSt) but 
results of only the contemporaneous variables are reported (as there is little difference 
between the two) to facilitate comparison of our OLS results with estimated coefficients 
of the aid-growth relationship in the literature. All regressions in Table 1.3 are corrected 
for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using FGLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
  
Table 1.3 Growth Regression Results  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD OLS FD
 IGDP -0.0001 -0.003 0.009 -0.001
(-1.15) (2.04)* (-0.39) (0.97)
AID 12.05 8.066 0.232 5.775
(2.19)* (2.62)* (0.15) (1.95)
PS 1.084 1.593
(4.12)*** (4.94)***
PRIM 0.098 0.744 0.043 1.299
(0.22) (0.25) (0.09) (0.45)
M2 0.049 0.106 0.049 0.108
(1.64) (2.51)* (1.39) (1.92)
BQUAL 0.727 1.303 0.583 0.99
(1.61) (1.98)* (1.37) (1.41)
DACC 0.253 1.535 0.363 1.102
(0.77) (2.13)* (1.1) (1.51)
GCONS -0.007 -0.095 -0.004 -0.198
(-0.18) (-0.84) (-0.1) (1.44)
LE 0.013 0.184 0.024 0.157
(0.46) (2.00)* (0.76) (1.69)
INVPROF 0.078 0.946 0.483 0.025
(0.3) (1.5) (2.56)* (0.06)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD OLS FD
AIDPS 0.872 0.332
(1.69) (1.98)*
STD_AID -1.861 -6.214 2.415 -2.416
(-0.57) (-1.63) (0.84) (-0.76)
Constant -8.48 -4.643
(2.29)* (-1.32)
Observations 167 102 167 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.55 0.19 0.4
 
Note: Each regression included a set of time dummies. Errors are corrected for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity.  The AID, PS and AIDPS variables are all lagged one 
period in the FD estimations.  Three outliers identified in the text, were deleted in each 
regression. The square of AID and the time dummies are never significant and are not 
reported. Student t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate level of significance: *, 
**, and *** reflect significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.    
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The FD estimations appear to fit the data better than the OLS because their 
coherence measures such as t-values of individual coefficients are higher than the OLS 
values irrespective of whether political stability is in the equation or not. The major 
results of the research as presented in the different Columns of Table 1.3 are that AID 
and PS both positively impact growth in SSA and that political stability enhances the 
growth-stimulating powers of aid. This is because from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3, 
aid, political stability and their interactions are positively related to growth at five percent 
significance level, respectively, by OLS and FD although the magnitude of the AID 
coefficient in the FD equation is smaller than in the OLS equation. Most importantly, 
since AIDPS, the interaction of aid and political stability is also significant (albeit at the 
0.1 level), we conclude that conditional on stability aid promotes growth.  
 The reduction in magnitude of the coefficient on aid for the FD estimate may be 
explained by the difference in the level of endogeneity treatment that OLS and FD 
respectively provide. Omitted variable bias, which cannot be reduced by OLS, went 
down with FD, indicating that unobserved country-specific effects constitute the majority 
of any possible omitted variable bias. Any remaining bias has to be time-varying as FD 
removes all time-invariant sources of bias. Although we are able to remove the time-
invariant unobserved effects by FD, endogeneity bias, albeit very limited, may still exist 
due to simultaneity despite lagging AID, AIDPS and PS.  
 We evaluated the possibility of endogeneity arising from simultaneity in earlier 
versions of the paper. In particular, we estimated the aid-growth equations by IV after re-
specifying the model as a system of 4-simultaneous equations. Although first stage 
regression F-statistics and the Stock and Yogo (2005) test suggested the instruments were 
not very strong, we got very similar results in terms of the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients on (AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1) to the OLS so simultaneity does not appear to 
be an issue but unobserved effect endogeneity is an issue. The absence of potentially 
important time-varying factors from the list of regressors could also undermine the 
robustness of regression results but previous iterations of the paper using such time-
varying factors as inflation or Burnside and Dollars’ (2000) policy variable did not 
significantly influence the results. 
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 For completeness, note that there may still be an endogeneity problem if there are 
unobserved time-varying country-specific characteristics that influence aid and growth. 
For example, some SSA countries may have different technologies of production, 
endowment, or institutions which can vary with time rendering FD estimation impotent at 
treating endogeneity.  Angrist and Pischke (2009) point out that the notion that "the 
important omitted variables are time-constant is implausible." Simple first-differencing 
may not be effective in this case so the estimation method should also address the 
endogeneity caused by time-varying variables. To account for this issue, in earlier 
versions of the paper, we used the "random growth" specification (Papke, 1994) that 
allows for endogeneity to be based on country-specific growth rates. We interacted a 
trend variable with the country dummies in a LSDV specification to accomplish this. This 
did not change the OLS results much so it seems that the bias is mainly based on time-
invariant variables. Finally, given that the sample size is small which compromised the 
strength of the instruments for aid in GMM and IV these estimation strategies offer no 
improvement over FD.  
 In comparison to results in columns 1 and 2, aid and political stability are 
insignificant in Columns 3 and 4 where political stability is omitted indicating political 
stability is an important pre-condition for aid. The majority of the coefficients of the 
other variables in our model have the expected sign in both OLS and FD estimations, 
where PS is included, although not many have statistically significant coefficients. 
To determine the economic relevance of the aid-growth relationship in SSA, we 
compute the marginal effects (MEs) of growth with respect to aid. The MEs were 
calculated for the OLS and FD estimations in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3.  We obtained 
a value of 0.12 for the ME of growth with respect to aid using OLS where aid is not 
lagged so that a one percent increase in aid will lead to a 0.12 percent increase in growth.  
In other words since AID is scaled by GDP, a $1 increase in aid will lead to a $0.12 
increase in GDP. Further, we obtain a value of 0.084 for the same ME using FD where 
aid is lagged after taking the significant AIDPS in the FD regression into account. In 
comparison, Islam (2005) finds using OLS (and data from all LDCs not just SSA) a unit 
increase in aid as a fraction of GDP, increases growth by 0.12 percent for LDCs. This 
agrees with our results.  
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 A potential concern about the robustness of the primary conclusions of the 
research that aid is more effective in more stable countries concerns the limitation of PS 
measure because it does not explicitly  reflect corruption which can often been an 
overriding problem.  However we did replace the PS measure with Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in previous estimations and arrived at 
the same conclusion because more corruption was associated with less growth. The result 
of the analysis should, however, be interpreted with care because about 30% of ODA aid 
is multi-lateral aid and the remaining 70% is bilateral aid although we used total ODA aid 
in the research. It is also worth noting, that the strategy of the new players in aid donation 
China and India (former recipients of aid) of providing aid to improve or build vital 
infrastructure in SSA (National Public Radio) may in the end yield better results than 
ODA which often does not focus on improving infrastructure in the recipient country. 
 
1.7 DECOMPOSITION OF THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STABILITY  
 To further decompose the effect of PS on the aid-growth relationship, we compute 
the aid-growth effect at different values of PS. From Figure 1.6, the marginal effect (ME) 
of aid on growth computed at the median of growth and aid is positive and rises very 
gradually at low levels of PS. Keeping in mind that the PS scale is from 0-12 with 12 
being most stable, it can be seen that at very high levels of PS (higher than the mean and 
median of PS), ME rises precipitously.  In fact, AID, AIDPS and PS are all weakly 
significant below a PS value of 6 at 5% significance level. At PS values greater than 6 
(the median of PS), these variables are strongly significant at 5% significance level.   
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Figure 1.6 Partial Effects at Different Levels of Political Stability 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Elasticity at Different Levels of Political Stability 
 
 
 Figure 1.7, which plots the elasticity of growth with respect to aid against PS, 
substantiates the point made in figure 1.6 because it shows that growth is inelastic at low 
levels of PS but elastic at very high levels of PS. Beyond the relatively high PS value of 
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10, a one percent increase in aid leads to a greater than one percent increase in growth.  
However, the majority of poor SSA countries have PS values lower than 10 which might 
explain of why the effect of aid on growth is sometimes difficult to discern in SSA.  
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 The research objective was to determine the sign and economic relevance of the 
relationship between aid and growth in SSA and further to investigate the consequence of 
political stability and economic policies on the aid-growth relationship. The evidence 
suggests that aid and growth are positively related at the five percent significance level, 
that political stability has a strong influence on the aid-growth relationship in SSA and 
that the aid-growth relationship suffers from endogeneity bias caused primarily by 
unobserved time-constant effects. Our results help to clarify why so much aid has done so 
little good in SSA. Aid is currently given independent of country stability. Based on our 
findings, aid is more effective at higher levels of stability so reaching the millennium 
development goals is more likely when aid is provided to stable SSA countries.  Aid can 
prevent starvation in poor unstable SSA countries, but cannot be expected to spur growth 
there. A policy recommendation of this paper is that the pursuit of political stability and 
good governance in SSA is not only a worthy objective in itself, but also because stability 
promotes growth and augments the growth-promoting power of aid.  
To make the principal results of this research that political stability makes aid 
more efficient at promoting growth-more meaningful, the determinants of political 
stability specifically in SSA are good candidates for further research. In particular it will 
be interesting to investigate how big a role a free press plays in the attainment of political 
stability.  
 Finally the literature could benefit from more detailed investigation in the issue of 
time-varying observed endogeneity. Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest a way to check 
the robustness of estimation when there is the possibility of residual bias due to latent but 
time-varying country-specific effects.  Their suggestion involves first performing an 
Arrelano and Bond (1991) or AB-type dynamic panel estimation.  However, they note 
that this estimate may be inconsistent if the lagged dependent variables are not 
uncorrelated with the error term and thus are not appropriate instruments. To check 
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robustness, they suggest performing two separate regressions (a) with the lagged 
dependent variable but no country-specific dummies and (b) without time dummies but 
with country-specific dummies.  Angrist and Pischke (2009) point out that if estimates of 
the slopes using AB-type estimation is statistically significant and its value is bracketed 
by the estimates from the regressions a and b, the time-varying endogeneity is not a 
significant issue. Despite Angrist and Pischke’s (2009) suggestions, to the best of our 
knowledge effective methods of treating endogeneity caused by latent time-varying 
country-specific effects remain elusive. 
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ESSAY 2:  ESTABLISHING THE FEASIBILITY OF USING THE COCOA FUTURES 
MARKET FOR RISK MANAGEMENT BY SUB-SAHARAN COCOA EXPORTERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0 SUMMARY  
 
Using recent New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) data, this paper investigates whether 
the cocoa futures market is unbiased and efficient using two and five-month forecast 
horizons. The presence of a time-varying (and or constant) risk premium is also assessed. 
Cash and futures prices are co-integrated and tests confirm market efficiency and 
unbiasedness in the long run. However, based on the necessary encompassing condition 
for efficiency, the cocoa futures market is biased and inefficient in the short run. Short-
run bias is not due to a time-varying or constant risk premium, but rather to informational 
inefficiency. Out-of-sample analysis, however, suggests informational inefficiency is 
limited in magnitude and insufficient to generate economically relevant profits in the 
short run. This implies the cocoa futures market is short-run efficient by the sufficiency 
criterion. Overall, the finding of both long and short-run futures market efficiency 
suggests futures’ hedging of cocoa export price risk is a feasible market-based risk 
management strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa’s cocoa exporters. 
 
Keywords: Cocoa, futures market, time-varying risk premium, and co-integration. 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Although cocoa futures markets provide price risk management opportunities for 
cocoa exporters in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), cocoa exporter participation in futures 
markets is low (Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako, and Grynberg, 2007 and Morgan, 2001). 
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Reasons offered to explain the limited participation in futures markets by cocoa exporters 
include mistrust, ignorance, margin and transaction costs, and financial requirements 
(Thompson, 1986; Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990). However, SSA cocoa 
exporters may limit the use of futures markets for hedging because they perceive that the 
cocoa futures markets produce biased and inefficient forecasts of cash prices (Sabuhoro 
and Larue, 1997). Biased and inefficient futures forecasts signal market failure and 
introduce additional costs in terms of sub-optimal hedging strategies (Thompson, 1986). 
Hedging may also involve other costs such as a risk premium (either time-varying or 
constant), making it less attractive.  
The relatively recent failures of non-market methods of managing cocoa export 
price risk with buffer funds and buffer stocks have led to an increased demand for 
market-based price risk management strategies such as hedging among cocoa exporters 
(Larson, Verangis and Anderson, 2004; Just, Khantachavana and Just, 2010). Relevant 
questions that emerge for assessing the usefulness of market strategies for risk 
management include: (1) Does the cocoa futures market offer a precise indication of the 
subsequent period cash price? (2) Should cocoa exporters expect to pay a risk premium 
(time-varying or constant) to use the futures market? If the answers to these questions 
support efficiency and the absence of a risk premium, then futures forecasts are unbiased 
implying that risk hedging with futures is feasible and propitious for cocoa exporters. 
Four of the world’s preeminent cocoa exporters, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), 
Cameroun and Nigeria, are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and account for sixty-nine 
percent of total world cocoa beans exports (Gibson, 2007). Cocoa exportation from these 
SSA countries is typically done by sovereign cocoa marketing boards whose 
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governments rely heavily on volatile cocoa export revenue to fund economic 
development (Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako, and Grynberg, 2007). Volatility in cocoa export 
prices induces risk both in the terms of trade (export price/import price) and export 
revenue. Elevated terms of trade and export revenue risk can undermine SSA’s economic 
development because SSA’s development is often export-driven (Rolfo, 1980). Since bias 
in futures markets reduces the accuracy of the forecast of the subsequent period cash 
price and undermines risk minimization through futures hedging, this paper tests whether 
the cocoa futures market is unbiased and efficient where unbiasedness is understood to be 
a joint hypothesis of risk neutrality and market efficiency (Beck, 1994).  
A test of futures market unbiasedness and efficiency remains pertinent because (i) 
significant ambiguity still surrounds the unbiasedness and efficiency of the cocoa futures 
market with different authors arriving at contrasting conclusions and (ii) futures forecast 
bias remains a topical issue as evidenced by the allegations in July 2011 of manipulation 
of cocoa prices on the London International Financial and Futures Exchange (LIFFE) by 
cocoa merchants (Futuresmag.com, 2011).  Here we clarify that the necessary condition 
for an efficient futures market is that current prices reflect all information implicit in 
price time series (Fama, 1970).  In contrast, the sufficient condition for market efficiency 
is that no analyst can manipulate the market to make money (Fama, 1970).   
Using in-sample data, cash and futures prices are found to be co-integrated; 
meaning cash and futures prices move together in the long run which is a necessary 
condition for long-run futures market efficiency. By comparison, the results of two 
different tests predicated on the necessary condition for efficiency indicate that the cocoa 
futures market is biased and inefficient in the short-run. The first test involved tests of 
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parameter restrictions on the Error Correction Model (ECM) while the second test used 
was Sanders and Manfredo’s (2005) modification of Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold’s 
(1998) test of forecast encompassing. Short-run bias is found to be due to informational 
inefficiency not to a risk premium.  
To verify the in-sample results (following Diebold and Nason (1990) and 
Mckenzie and Holt (2002)), out-of-sample analysis were performed which revealed that 
the cocoa futures market is short-run efficient by the sufficient condition of efficiency as 
it is difficult to generate economically relevant profits. The finding of both short and 
long-run futures market efficiency by the sufficiency criterion suggests futures’ hedging 
of cocoa revenue risk is a feasible market-based risk management strategy for SSA’s 
cocoa exporters. 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Beck (1994), Subahuro and Larue (1997), and Manayi and Struthers (1997) all 
tested for unbiasedness and efficiency of the cocoa futures market and attempted to 
identify a constant (but not time-varying) risk premium in the cocoa futures market. 
Notably, they arrive at opposite conclusions, indicating that significant ambiguity still 
surrounds cocoa futures efficiency and unbiasedness. Further, since the available 
literature uses data that are somewhat dated, existing research results regarding cocoa 
futures market inefficiency and bias may no longer be relevant for current decisions. 
Beck (1994) rejects the efficiency and unbiasedness of the cocoa futures market 
and the hypothesis of a constant risk premium in cocoa futures markets. She uses 
NYBOT data from 1966 to 1986 and employs co-integration techniques to evaluate cocoa 
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market inefficiency and bias. Beck (1994) performs her analysis for 8-week (2-month) 
and 24-week (6-month) forecast horizons. For the 8-week horizon forecast, Beck pools 
data from five cocoa futures contracts. The cash price used is the expiration day futures 
price and the corresponding futures forecast price is the futures price recorded 8 weeks 
prior to expiration. By contrast, data from only one contract was used for the longer 24-
week forecast horizon, although the cash price is still the futures price at expiration. Beck 
(1994) ascribes cocoa futures forecast bias to informational inefficiency, which is the 
inability of the cocoa futures market to incorporate all available information to produce 
unbiased forecasts of the subsequent cash prices and not to the presence of a risk 
premium in cocoa futures. Beck (1994) only considers a constant risk premium and does 
not allow for the possibility of a time-varying risk premium.  
Sabuhoro and Larue’s (1997) disagree that a bias exists in the cocoa futures 
market. They employ Johansen and Juselius' co-integration tests, Hansen (1992)’s test of 
the stability of co-integration parameters, and an error correction model (ECM) to test for 
cocoa futures market inefficiency and bias. Sabuhoro and Larue (1997) used daily cash 
and futures data for contracts with maturities of two and six months from the Coffee, 
Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) from 1983 to 1990. They conclude that the futures 
market is unbiased and efficient and that there is no risk premium. However, Sabuhoro 
and Larue (1997)’s use of cash and futures data that terminated in 1990 calls into 
question the applicability of their results to contemporary hedging decisions.  
Manayi and Struthers (1997) test for cointegration between cocoa spot and futures 
prices.  They also test for futures market efficiency and unbiasedness. They use monthly 
spot and futures data from the London International Financial Futures and Options 
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Exchange (LIFFE) from 1985 to 1991, different cointegration tests, and a GARCH (1, 1) 
in mean model to ascertain futures market efficiency and bias. They conclude that cocoa 
cash and futures prices are not co-integrated, and the cocoa futures market is biased and 
inefficient and exhibits a positive risk premium. Specifically, they argue that for non-
stationary data, co-integration is a necessary albeit insufficient condition for futures 
market efficiency and unbiasedness. However, since they find that the cocoa cash and 
futures prices are non-stationary but not co-integrated, they conclude the cocoa futures 
market is long-run biased and inefficient. They assert that the cocoa futures market is 
“informationally inefficient” in the short run and that short-run profitable opportunities 
exist for speculators in the cocoa futures market. Manayi and Struthers, however, indicate 
that the GARCH specifications they employed were restrictive, because the GARCH 
terms were insignificant while the ARCH (1) coefficient in the mean equation was 
significant. They suggest the use of ARCH type model to test for a risk premium.   
The conclusions of the various studies testing for cocoa futures market efficiency 
and for risk premiums vary and are often contradictory. This occurs because of subtle 
differences (i) in the research methods used, (ii) in the range, construction and origin of 
the futures series used by the different authors and (iii) because the authors differ in how 
much care they devote to testing for structural breaks, stationarity, cointegration, and 
market efficiency.   
To illustrate, a difference in the data and methods employed is that Subahuro and 
Larue (1997) pooled data from different contracts in building the futures data series--their 
research therefore suffered from the overlapping horizon problem--but Beck (1994) does 
not pool data from different futures contracts. Further, Beck (1994) assumed a constant 
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risk premium in testing for market efficiency but Sabuhoro and Larue (1997) ignore the 
existence of a risk premium. Sabuhoro and Larue (1997) do not assume cointegration is 
equivalent to long-run market efficiency but test separately for long-run market 
efficiency and unbiasdeness. In contrast, Beck (1994) assumes cointegration is equivalent 
to long-run market efficiency and so only focuses on testing for cointegration. 
A difference in the data ranges used by the different authors is illustrated by the 
fact that although the futures data employed by both Beck (1994) and Subahuro and 
Larue (1997) came from the NBYOT, Beck (1994) used data from 1966 to 1986 while 
Subahuro and Larue (1997) employed data from 1983-1990. Market efficiency might be 
dependent on the range of data used (Beck, 1994; Elam and Dixon, 1988). In particular, 
structural breaks occurring in one particular price range but not the other may result in 
differences in the data generation process of the prices in the different ranges which make 
it difficult to accurately determine efficiency. 
Unlike Beck (1994) and Subahuro and Larue (1997) who use data from the 
NYBOT, Manayi and Struthers (1997) used data from the London FOX. Given the 
differences in methods, range and origin of the data used, the contrasting conclusions 
regarding market efficiency and unbiasedness is perhaps not so strange. 
Interestingly however, none of the previous authors test for a structural break in 
the data as we do here although structural breaks can undermine the validity of tests of 
unit roots and hence of cointegration and market efficiency. In particular, in testing for a 
unit root, a structural break that is neither detected, nor accounted for, will yield biased or 
incorrect results of tests of stationarity (Frank and Garcia, 2009). Given a suggestive 
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break in the data for the current data (see Figure 2.1), we test for a structural break prior 
to conducting tests of stationarity and market efficiency. 
Figure 2.1 Evidence of a Structural Break in 1978 in Cash and Futures Prices ($/ton) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: NYBOT 
 
We contribute to the literature by assessing the efficiency of the cocoa futures market 
using both the necessary and sufficient conditions for market efficiency while taking the 
time series properties of the cash and futures data into account. 
 
2.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 Futures price data from 1980-2008 were obtained from the New York Board of 
Trade (NYBOT) which has an active and liquid cocoa market. As is typical in this 
literature, the analysis employs both a long horizon which is the relevant horizon (five-
months) for hedgers but has few observations, as well as a shorter horizon (two-months) 
which is less relevant but has more observations. Pragmatically, SSA cocoa exporters 
may place a hedge in the pre-harvest period (July) for protection against price 
fluctuations during harvest (December), a five-month hedge horizon. The main cocoa 
harvest season is from November to January with peak harvest in December. Pre-harvest 
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is from February to October (COCOBOD, 2000), so it is possible to have different hedge 
horizons, but for simplicity we focus on the five-month July-December hedge. 
 Presently few SSA exporters hedge their risk with the cocoa futures market. The 
hedgers in the current cocoa futures market are cocoa buyers such as cocoa processors, 
chocolate manufacturers and merchants who deal in cocoa beans, while speculators who 
provide liquidity include small and large investors (Dand, 1999). Unlike most SSA cocoa 
exporters who have little experience hedging price risk with futures markets, current 
market participants have extensive experience in using the futures markets and have 
elaborate research divisions to analyze price movements and to make hedging decisions 
(Dand, 1999). For the existing hedgers, a hedge horizon of two-months is sufficient, since 
they constantly use cocoa beans and require protection against price fluctuation over both 
short and long horizons. For SSA cocoa producers not now hedging but who may 
consider placing pre-harvest to harvest hedges, however, longer five-month horizons are 
more meaningful. 
 Statistically it is not feasible to test for short-run futures market unbiasedness with 
a five-month horizon while avoiding the overlapping horizons problem, because this will 
result in very few observations leading to unreliable results. Futures forecast bias may 
emanate either from a (time-varying) risk premium or from informational inefficiency 
although the decomposition of the bias is seldom straightforward (Frank and Garcia, 
2009).  ARCH-type models used to test for the presence of a time-varying risk premium 
in the short-run require high frequency data usually available with short-horizon data. 
Longer forecast horizons (5-months) result in low frequency data that smooth time series 
data. Smoothed time series data mask the ARCH-effects that are indicative of a time-
38 
  
varying risk premium compromising tests for a short-run time-varying risk premium and 
hence for short-run unbiasedness (Frank and Garcia, 2009).   
 We follow the compromise in the literature (See Beck, 1994 and Subahuro and 
Larue, 1997) and test for market efficiency and for a time-varying risk premium in the 
short run exclusively with a two-month horizon and for long-run market efficiency with 
both a short horizon (two-month) and a longer (five-month) horizon. Subahuro and Larue 
(1997) also use two and six-month forecast horizons in order to determine if tests for long 
and short-run market efficiency yielded consistent results irrespective of the duration of 
the forecast horizon. However, their analysis suffered from the problem of overlapping 
horizons because they pooled data from different contracts. Overlapping data may lead to 
an overstatement of information content in prices and can distort standard errors. Further, 
the time span for their analysis was relatively short (1983 to 1990). We use a longer time 
period (1980-2008), only the December contract and a five-month instead of a six-month 
horizon because the former is more relevant for SSA cocoa exporters’ hedging decisions.
 The data for both the two and five-month horizons span from 1980 to 2008, but to 
test for-short run unbiasedness and evaluate out-of-sample forecast accuracy with a 
sufficient number of observations, we divide the two-month horizon data into an in-
sample period, 1980.1-2003.5, and an out of-sample period, 2004.1-2008.1. The dates 
refer to the year and the five futures contract maturity months: March, May, July, 
September and December. For instance, 2004.1 refer to the March maturity of 2004. The 
futures price used is the settlement price for a specific trading day. At expiration, this 
price is the forecast of the subsequent cash price. Theoretically, at expiration, the futures 
price is equal to the spot price except for a transactions cost band because arbitrage drives 
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them together (Beck, 1994). In practice, the expiration date futures price is often used 
instead of the spot price, because the latter is seldom available for the same grade and 
location of the commodity (Beck, 1994; Frank and Garcia, 2009).  Figure 2.2 below plots 
of the futures and price cash price data used in this research over the relevant data range. 
 
Figure 2.2 New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) Cocoa Cash and Futures: 1980.1-2003.5 
 
 
 
 
The cones in the lower part of the figure are forecast errors.   
 
 
 A two-month horizon coincides with the highest level of futures trading activity in 
terms of both volume and open interest. Further, the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of futures market efficiency and unbiasedness increases as the forecast 
horizon increases (Subahuro and Larue, 1997). A rejection of the null of futures market 
efficiency and unbiasedness is therefore a more powerful result the shorter the forecast 
horizon (Subahuro and Larue, 1997).  
 For the two-month horizon, we count back two-months from expiration (40 
business days), and use the futures settlement price as the two-month forecast. Since 
there are five futures contract months for cocoa, there are five observations per year for 
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the two-month horizon yielding a total of 120 observations for the in-sample period 
(1980.1-2005.5) and 21 observations in the out-of-sample period (2004.1 to 2008.1). The 
NYBOT cocoa contracts do not expire every other month so it is impossible to build a 
dataset with equal forecast horizons and spacing. Following McKenzie and Holt (2002), 
Beck (1994), and Frank and Garcia (2009), a longer forecast horizon in December 
(approximately 60 days) was used for the two-month horizon. 
 For the five-month horizon, we count back five months from expiration (100 
business days), and use the futures settlement price as the five-month forecast. The five-
month horizon yields only one observation per year because only the December contract 
is used, which limits data severely, especially for testing for a short-run risk premium and 
for short-run market unbiasedness. Using the five-month forecast horizon yields only 28 
observations (1980-2008). Consequently, low power unit roots and cointegration tests 
become less meaningful and time-varying risk premiums cannot be identified because the 
(Q) ARCH-type and (Q) GARCH-type models that are typically employed to identify a 
time-varying risk premium need considerably more higher frequency data. By comparing 
the results of the five-month horizon to the two-month horizon which has more data we 
are able to trade pragmatism (the relevant and longer horizon and limited data) with 
feasibility (the shorter horizon with more data) in order to draw inference regarding 
futures market bias, efficiency and the presence of a time-varying risk premium in the 
futures market.  
 
2.4 PROCEDURES  
Structural break and Unit Root Tests  
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 The choice of an appropriate model for analysis depends on the characteristics of 
the data. It is thus essential to verify the degree of integration of both the cash and futures 
price data, because the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on non-stationary 
data yields spurious results (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Furthermore, the results of 
standard tests of stationarity such as the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test can be 
influenced by structural breaks. When structural breaks are not properly accounted for in 
testing for unit roots, there is a higher likelihood of drawing incorrect conclusions 
regarding the stationarity of the data (Perron, 1989). The Zivot and Andrews (1992) test 
or the ZA test can be used to assess possible structural break points. The null hypothesis 
in the ZA test is that the variable contains a unit-root with a drift that excludes any 
structural break. The alternative hypothesis is that the series is a trend stationary process 
with a one-time break in the trend variable occurring at an unknown point in time.  
 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) (or the ADF test) and the Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) or the KPSS test are typically used to test for 
stationarity because they complement each other as they have opposite null hypotheses. 
While the null hypothesis of the ADF test is the presence of a unit root, the null 
hypothesis of the KPSS test is the absence of a unit root. Three distinct models were 
accounted for in executing the ADF test: with constant only, with constant and trend and 
with no constant and no trend, while incorporating lags ranging from 1 to 5. We use 5 
lags to reflect the 5 contract months for cocoa futures. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) was used to determine lag structure (Enders, 2004). If the cash and futures prices 
are both non-stationary, it is possible that they are co-integrated (Enders, 2004). If the 
spot and futures prices are co-integrated, then the futures market is likely to be efficient 
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in the long run because identical factors determine both the spot and futures prices, so 
they should not diverge from each other (Beck, 1994). When futures prices are co-
integrated, an ECM which simultaneously captures short- and long-run effects can be 
defined and estimated (McKenzie and Holt, 2002 and Beck, 1994). Given co-integration 
of cash and futures prices, the sufficient conditions for long-run unbiasedness are 
restrictions on the error correction mechanism between futures and future spot prices 
(Subahuro and Larue, 1997).  
 For non-stationary cash and futures prices, co-integration is a necessary albeit 
insufficient condition for futures market efficiency in the long run (Manayi and Struthers, 
1997). To test for a co-integration relationship between cash and futures prices, either the 
Engle-Granger two-step or Johansen (1988)’s test can be used. Once cointegration is 
established there are several ways to test for long-run market efficiency and 
unbiasedness.  Two of the main methods usually employed are (1) Johansen’s method, 
which imposes likelihood ratio restrictions on the co-integrating vector in a (Vector) 
Error Correction ((V)ECM) framework, and (2) Davidson and Mackinnon’s (1981) non-
nested J-type test, which discriminates between the restricted ECM with the (0, 1) futures 
market efficiency and unbiasedness restriction imposed and the unrestricted ECM. The 
latter test is executed within the Engle and Granger framework.  An advantage of the 
second test over the more commonly used Johansen test of LR restrictions in verifying 
market unbiasedness and efficiency is that it does not assume that the conditional 
variance is constant. When the variance of the error of the ECM is non-constant and the 
form of the conditional variance can be modeled, this test of market efficiency can be 
modified to incorporate the form of the conditional variance.  
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Model Selection and Long-Run Tests  
 Model selection is complicated, because unbiasedness and efficiency of the 
futures market have a temporal dimension: the market could be biased (or not), inefficient 
(or not) either in the long or short run. Further, there may be a risk premium which may 
be time-varying or constant in the long run or the short run.  
Let’s begin with the notion that arbitrage usually forces current futures price to equal 
the expected future cash price for the same commodity at contract maturity (McKenzie 
and Holt, 2002). This is illustrated in equation (1) below: 
(1) Et-1St  =  Ft-1                                                                                                
where Et-1St is the expectation of the current cash price conditional on information 
available in the previous period, and Ft-1 is the price of the futures contract that will 
mature in period t. Assuming a linear rational expectations framework, (1) can be 
rewritten as (2): 
(2) St   = α0 + α 1 F t-1   +   µ t                                                                       
where St in (2) is a non-stationary series and µt is the error term. Given the specification 
in (2), the joint hypothesis of long-run market efficiency and unbiasedness is given by 
Ho: α0 = 0 and α 1 = 1.   
When St and F t-1 in (2) are non-stationary, we can define a first difference version of                                                     
(2) to make it stationary. This is achieved in (3): 
(3)   St   =    α 1 F t-1   +   µ t                                                           
where  in (3) is the first difference operator, such that St = St - St-1.  However, the 
transformation in (3) is mis-specified when the cash and futures prices are co-integrated 
(McKenzie and Holt, 2002).  When the cash and futures prices are co-integrated, an ECM 
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must be estimated to account for the long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
respective cash and futures series. The structure of the ECM is given as: 
(4) St =   m - µt-1  +  ψ 1F t-1  + 
1
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m is a constant term, µt-1 = St-1 - α0 - α 1  F t-2 is the stationary error correction term, Di is a 
vector of dummy variables such that D3, D5, D7, D9 and D12 are dummies for March, 
May, July and September, and take a value of one if the data are from the corresponding 
month and zero otherwise. D12 is omitted to avoid singularity. The magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient on the error correction term () indicates the speed of adjustment of 
any disequilibrium towards the long-run equilibrium state (McKenzie and Holt, 2002; 
and Beck, 1994). 
 To implement the Davidson and MacKinnon J-type test of long–run market 
efficiency previously described, the (0, 1) futures market efficiency and unbiasedness 
restrictions on the cointegrating vector are imposed as in (5) 
(5) ΔSt  = n -ρ(St-1  - F t-2)  +  ψ1 Δ F t-1    +   j
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where n = m + ραo is a constant and St-1 – αo – α1 Ft-2 has been substituted for µt-1, the 
error correction term in (4). The non-nested J-tests of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) 
discriminate between the ECM with and without the (0, 1) cointegrating vector imposed. 
If the latter model (5) is preferred to the former (4), or if both are judged equivalent, the 
null of (0, 1) cointegrating vector cannot be rejected.  The J-statistic typically has a t-
distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. P-values that represent the probabilities of 
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falsely rejecting the null hypothesis are typically provided to help interpret the test 
results. The interested reader is referred to Subahuro and Larue (1997) and Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) for more details of this test.  
 When the variance of the error of the ECM is non-constant and the form of the 
conditional variance can be modeled, this test of market efficiency can be modified to 
incorporate the form of the conditional variance.  For example, if there is a positive 
ARCH-p term in the error of the ECM that contributes to a time-varying risk premium, 
then the test of long-run market efficiency must discriminate between an ARCH-M-p-
ECM with and without the (0, 1) market efficiency restriction imposed. Note that there is 
nothing within the structure of the ECM that prevents σ t 
2
 or the unconditional variance 
from varying, so the ECM cannot be used to identify time-varying risk premiums. 
However by testing for (Q) ARCH and (Q) GARCH effects in the error of the ECM, the 
correct form of the conditional variance can be identified so that the appropriate (Q) 
ARCH-p-M-ECM model can be applied. Correct modeling of the conditional variance is 
important for testing for a time-varying risk premium, for testing for market inefficiency 
and for supporting accurate statistical inference. It is also important to determine the 
appropriate number of lags of cash and futures prices to incorporate into (4). However, 
economic theory provides little guidance on the correct number of lags of the cash and 
futures price to include in (4). Economic theory is also not forthcoming regarding the 
structure of the conditional variance term in (4). To decide on the number of lags of the 
futures and cash prices to include in (4), we minimize the AIC for lags one to five after 
adding both cash and futures prices to the first difference specification in (3). The results 
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of the empirics dictate the addition of just one lag of the first difference of the cash price 
to the ECM so the actual form of the ECM in (4) estimated is given in (6) is: 
(6) St =   m  -  µt-1 - ψ1 F t-1 +  Ω 1 S t-1   +  Ф3D3 + Ф5D5 + Ф7D7 + Ф9D9   +  µt                               
where all variables in (6) are previously defined. 
  To determine the presence and form of the conditional volatility in the cash 
equation, we performed both LM ARCH and QARCH tests. The LM ARCH test involves 
regressing the squared OLS residual from (6) on an intercept and the lagged residuals of 
(6). The test statistic (the sample size (N) * R2) has a chi-square distribution with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of lags, p, NR
2
 ~ χ
2 
p.  LM QARCH tests are performed 
by regressing the squared OLS residual on an intercept, the lagged residuals and the cross 
products of residuals of lags of different lengths. The test statistic has a χ2 distribution 
with p (p+3)/2 degrees of freedom (Sentana, 1995).  
 Although the ECM in (6) is correctly specified to test the long-run unbiasedness 
conditions, it assumes a constant variance and so by construction it cannot adequately 
identify a time-varying risk premium in cocoa futures. This is because a risk premium is a 
reflection of the underlying uncertainty in the market which changes with time, and so 
the variance also changes with time because it is a measure of the risk premium. As it 
stands, the ECM cannot capture changes in the underlying uncertainties in the market 
because changes in the variance are not reflected in the model; An ECM-M model is 
needed.  Furthermore, if LM ARCH and QARCH tests performed on the error of the 
ECM identify an ARCH or QARCH term, then a (Q) ARCH-p-M-ECM (p = 1,2,3..) 
instead of the ECM is appropriate for testing for a time-varying risk premium, futures 
market unbiasedness and efficiency. We employ a form of McKenzie and Holt (2002)’s 
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QGARCH-p-M-ECM model and methodology to pinpoint the source of short-run futures 
market efficiency and bias for a time-varying risk premium. Specifically, we use an 
ARCH-p-M-ECM (p = 1,2,3…) not a (Q) GARCH-p-M-ECM to test for market 
efficiency and bias and to identify a time-varying risk premium because no GARCH 
effects were identified.  
The structure of the general ARCH-p-M-ECM is:      
(7) St =  m- µt-1  +  ψ 1F t-1 +   σ t   + 
1
I
i
i t i
S
 
  +  j
2
 
j
j t j
F
 
 +  Ф3D3 + Ф5D5 + 
Ф7D7 + Ф9D9    + µt   where µ t | µ t-q ~ N (0, σ t 
2
).  
The conditional variance is specified as: 
(8) σt
2 
= π0   +   
1
Q
qq
q


  µ2 t-q   and π0, π qq   > 0, ∑ π qq < 1.     
 For meaningful results the magnitude of  must differ from zero because spot 
price changes respond to deviations from long-run equilibrium.  Further, ψ1 must be non-
zero since changes in the futures forecast price are incorporated in the current spot price 
(McKenzie and Holt, 2002). Note also that σ t is a measure of volatility, the standard 
deviation, of µt while π0, πq, and πqq are estimated coefficients of the variance so must be 
necessarily non-negative.   
 
Unbiasedness, Market Efficiency and the Risk premium Hypothesis in the Short-Run 
 Failure to reject the null hypothesis of long-run futures market efficiency and 
unbiasedness (α0 = 0; α1 = 1 in (2)) implies tests of short-run market efficiency and 
unbiasedness may be identical concepts.  Note that the tests of short-run market 
efficiency and unbiasedness employed in this paper were formulated and first applied by 
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McKenzie and Holt (2002). In this formulation if α0 = 0, there is no constant long-run 
risk premium therefore a short-run constant risk premium is also unlikely. If a short-run 
risk premium exists, it is likely to be time-varying.  We will return to this issue later. If 
markets are long-run unbiased, however, we can jointly test for short-run market 
efficiency and bias with tests derived by McKenzie and Holt (2002) using the ECM. 
Following McKenzie and Holt (2002) short-run market efficiency implies 
(9)   Hypothesis 1:    = 1;  α1 = ψ 1  ≠ 0 ;   Ω i  = ψ j  = 0   
where ψ1, the coefficient associated with last period’s change in the futures price, is 
nonzero because new information that affects the futures price also affects the impending 
spot price change (McKenzie and Holt, 2002).  Ω i = ψ j = 0 arises since these lagged cash 
and futures prices should not affect the current price.  If these short-run restrictions fail to 
hold, past futures and spot prices would contain relevant information not completely 
incorporated in the t-1 futures price that can be used to forecast the period t cash price, 
violating informational efficiency in the short run. In efficient markets, all past 
information is already incorporated in the t-1 futures price; therefore, the lagged futures 
price should have no effect on current spot price (Fama, 1970). As explained by MH 
(2002), the logic behind the restrictions  = 1; α1 = ψ 1   ≠ 0;   Ω i = ψ j  = 0 can be 
understood by rewriting (6) as: 
(6
’
) St = (1-) St-1 + ψ 1  Ft-1 + (α1- ψ 1) Ft-2  + α1   +  Ф3D3 + Ф5D5 + Ф7D7 + Ф9D9   +  µt   
where  St-1 – αo – α1 Ft-2 has been substituted for µt-1, the error correction term. Note that it 
is possible to have a short-run efficient but biased futures forecast so the risk premium and 
its constituent sources of inefficiencies need not be non-zero to test for short-run efficiency. 
By comparison, short-run unbiasedness holds if the restrictions in (10) apply: 
49 
  
(10) Hypothesis 2:  = 1;  ψ 1  =  1;   Ω i  = ψ j  = 0;  m = 0,   = 0 and Пi = 0. 
The restriction   = Пi = 0 holds because an unbiased forecast cannot be inefficient thus 
variances and covariances of different lags of cash should not affect the current price.  
Similarly,  should be zero because a non-zero time-varying risk premium will imply a 
biased forecast. Notice that if the non-linear restrictions in (9) do not hold, then short-
run futures market efficiency will be compromised because past futures and spot prices 
would contain relevant information not completely incorporated in the t – 1 futures price 
but which could be used to used to forecast the current spot price (MH, 2002).  
However, if (10) does not old then the futures market is short-run biased.  In 
comparison, the sufficient condition for identifying a time-varying risk premium () is 
the rejection of the null in hypothesis 3. 
(11) Hypothesis 3: Ho:  = 0.         
If the long run tests of efficiency identify a zero constant risk premium then the short-run 
risk premium will also be constant. In that case, identification of a short-run time-varying 
risk premium is evidence that at least some of any bias in futures markets is due to a risk 
premium. However, the sign of , the coefficient on σt, can only be determined 
empirically (Frank and Garcia, 2009). If  is positive, then the market is experiencing 
normal backwardation where the market is dominated by short hedgers who pay a risk 
premium to long speculators to bear the spot price risk. On the other hand, if  is negative 
then the market is under conditions of contango where the market is dominated by long 
hedgers paying a risk premium to short speculators (Keynes, 1930). If  is statistically 
insignificant, a time-varying risk premium does not exist in the cocoa futures market in 
either the long-run or the short-run. 
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 Suppose the null hypothesis of a short-run time-varying risk premium is rejected, 
then short-run bias in futures market forecast of subsequent period cash prices is due to 
informational inefficiency. This is because in the context of the ARCH-M-p-ECM in (7), 
the time-varying risk premium  is represented by a conditional variance with a time-
varying risk component.  A finding that  is insignificant indicates that there is no time-
varying or constant risk premium in the cocoa futures market in the short run so that any 
futures bias is due to informational inefficiency. This is obviously the case if long run 
tests preformed already established a zero constant risk premium, so that there is little 
likelihood of a constant risk premium in the short run. 
 Tests we conducted for Q (ARCH) and ARCH effects identified the presence of 
an ARCH-3; therefore, we initially use both the ECM and the ARCH-3-M-ECM model 
for testing for short run market efficiency, bias and for a risk premium. As the results 
section will show we however focused on the ECM results based on evidence 
undermining the validity of the ARCH-3-M-ECM.   
 
2.5 RESULTS 
The ZA test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root with no structural 
breaks for the levels of cash and futures prices using both two and five-month maturities. 
The critical values of the ZA test exceed the ZA test-statistic values for the levels of both 
cash and futures prices.  For the two-month-horizon, p-values of 0.056 and 0.06 are 
obtained, respectively, for the levels of the cash and futures where the ZA critical value is 
-5.08. For the five-month horizon, p-values of 0.07 and 0.065 are obtained, respectively, 
for the levels of the cash and futures given the same critical value. Since the null 
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hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected, the alternate hypothesis of a stationary series 
with a one-time structural break does not hold. 
 The ZA test provides no evidence of a structural break in the cash and futures 
prices for the two- and five-month month forecast horizons. Plots of the cash and futures 
data and futures forecast error in Figure 2 confirm visually the absence of breaks in the 
data for the two-month horizon. The results of ADF and the KPSS tests of stationarity 
indicate that the cash and futures price are cointegrated for both the two-month and five-
month forecast horizons. Futures and cash prices are integrated of order one, while the 
error of the regression of the levels of the cash on futures is stationary (integrated of order 
zero) for both two- and five-month horizons. To provide some detail for the tests, for the 
two-month horizon, the p-values for the ADF test for the levels and first difference of the 
cash prices are 0.077 and 0.045. The p-values for the ADF test for the levels and first 
difference of futures prices are 0.08 and 0.049 and the p-values for the ADF test for the 
error of the regression of the levels of cash on the levels of futures is 0.046. The 
corresponding statistics for the five-month horizon are respectively: 0.08, 0.07, 0.09, 
0.056 and 0.06 also indicating cash and futures are cointegrated because both cash and 
futures have unit roots but the error from the regression of cash on futures is white noise. 
The five percent critical value of -2.88 used for comparison with test statistic values is 
due to Engle and Granger (1987) and was obtained from Enders (2004). 
 For both two- and five-month horizons, the KPSS test results also demonstrate 
that the null hypothesis of no unit root is rejected for the levels of the cash and futures 
prices, and is not rejected for the first difference of the cash and futures and for the error 
of the regression of the cash price on futures prices, respectively. The residuals from the 
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regressions of the levels of cash on futures are stationary for both the five and two-month 
horizons so cocoa cash and futures prices appear to be co-integrated by the Engle and 
Granger criterion for cointegration.  
We also present results of Johansen (1988)’s co-integration test which is 
evaluated respectively by the trace and lambda-max statistics (See Table 2.1 on the next 
page).  
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Table 2.1 Results of Johansen Co-integration and Alternate Tests of Futures Market Efficiency and Unbiasedness: 2-Month Horizon 
# of cointegrating vectors Statistic Value Statisitc Value Decision
0 104.694 19.96 97.63 15.67 REJECT
1 7.0685 9.42 7.06 9.24 ACCEPT
2) LR Test of (0, 1) restriction on the Cointeration relationship
Variable Name Coefficient Standard Error p>z
Cash 1.01 0.004 0
Futures 1
Constraints 1 [_ce1]fp = 1
2 [_ce1]constant= 0
LR test of identifying restrictions Chi-sq(1) 1.9 p>Chi-sq = 0.089
Model Inference
ECM H0: (4) is preferred
H0: (5) is preferred to (4) to (5)
J-statistic = 0.61 J-statistic =  4.02 Model (5) is chosen
p-value  = 0.52 p-value  = 0.02 Restrictions are valid
ARCH-M-ECM H0: (4) is preferred
H0: (5) is preferred to (4) to (5) Model (5) is chosen
J-statistic = 0.75 J-statistic = 4.22 Restrictions are valid
p-value=0.63 p-value  =0.01
3) Davidson and MacKinon non-nested test to discriminate between ECM (and ARCH-M- ECM) with and without efficiency and 
unbiasedness restrictions imposed
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The lambda-max statistic is derived from a test of the null hypothesis that the cointegration rank 
is equal to r against the alternative that the rank is equal to r+1. In contrast, the trace test is 
derived from a test of the null hypothesis that the cointegration rank is equal to r against the 
alternative that the cointegration rank is k where r and k are positive integers.  
From Table 2.1, the trace statistics corresponding to the null of zero and one cointegrating 
vectors for the two-month maturity are respectively 104.69 and 7.06 and the corresponding 
critical values are respectively 19.96 and 9.42. In comparison, the lambda-max statistics for zero 
and one cointegrating vectors for the two-month maturity are respectively 97.63 and 7.06 and the 
corresponding critical values are respectively 15.67 and 9.2. Clearly, both the trace and lambda-
max (maximum Eigen-value) statistics of Johansen’s co-integration test reject the null of zero 
cointegrating vectors, but confirm the presence of one co-integrating vector for the two-month 
horizon. Similar results are obtained for the five-month horizon. Given the hypothesis of zero and 
one cointegration vectors for the five-month horizon, the trace statistics are respectively 21.2 and 
7.1 while the critical values are respectively 19.9 and 9.4, so the presence of one cointegration 
vector is confirmed while the absence of a cointegration vector is rejected. 
 Table 2.1 also contains the results of the two tests for long-run market efficiency, 
unbiasedness and a zero long-run constant risk premium for the two-month horizon. The first test 
involves imposing (0, 1) market efficiency, unbiasedness and zero long-run constant risk 
premium restrictions by means of likelihood ratio (LR) restrictions on the Johansen cointegrating 
vector in the ECM. Note that from our analysis so far, the relevant ECM model has a simple form 
where the dependent variable is the first difference of the cash price and the independent variables 
are (i) the first difference of the futures (ii) the lag of the first difference of the cash price and (iii) 
the error from the OLS regression of the cash on futures. Regression results of the ECM are 
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presented in column 1, Table 2.3. It is clear that the absolute value of the coefficient of the error 
correction term ρ is significantly different from zero, as it should be in any well-defined ECM. 
 Using the first test of long-run market efficiency, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
long-run market efficiency, unbiasedness and zero long-run constant risk premium (p-value 
0.089) for the two-month forecast horizons. Similar results are obtained for the five-month 
horizon. Given the (0, 1) restrictions in the ECM, we obtain a p-value of 0.091 for the five-month 
horizon so the futures market is long-run unbiased and efficient for both five and two-month 
horizons.  
 Although we focus here on the ECM results, the results of the tests for ARCH effects 
(Table 2.2) identified a significant term (ARCH 3) in the error of the ECM so in theory, an 
ARCH-M-3-ECM is the more appropriate model. However because we discovered that the non-
negativity constraints for the variance terms in the ARCH-3-M-ECM are violated (Table 2.3) we 
will focus on the ECM results and report the ARCH-M-3-ECM strictly for the purposes of 
comparison.  
 
Table 2.2   LM Test Results for ARCH Conditional Volatility: Two-Month Horizon 
 
 
1 lag 0.93 ut-1
2
 = 0
2 lags 0.96 ut-1
2
 = 0
ut-2
2
 = 0
3 lags 0.008 ut-1
2
 = 0
ut-2
2
 = 0
ut-3
2
 = 0
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Notes: The results identify a significant ARCH-3 term. Lags refer to the number of lagged squared 
residuals used in the LM ARCH test.  p-values of the χ2 distribution with appropriate degrees of 
freedom 
 
Table 2.3 Results of the ECM and ARCH-ECM Estimation: Two-Month Horizon 
 
  ECM  
ARCH-3-M-
ECM 
m 20.7 37.75 
 (0.33) (1.3) 
ψ 1 0.63 0.7 
 (3.85) (4.9) 
Ω 1 -0.16 -0.41 
 (-0.41) (-2.23) 
ρ -0.8 -0.89 
 (-4.10) (-5.25) 
π 0   37.75 15267 
 (1.3) (4.05) 
Ѳ  -0.007 
  (-0.53) 
π 33  -0.52 
R
2 
 
(-2.44) 
0.75 
 
 i.ECM: St =  m- µt-1 +  ψ 1F t-1 + Ω 1 S t-1 +  σ t   +  j
2
 
j
j t j
F
 
 +  µt  . 
 ii.ARCH-3-M-ECM: St =  m- µt-1 +  ψ 1F t-1 +  Ω 1 S t-1 +   σ t   +  j
2
 
j
j t j
F
 
 +  µt    
  where σt
2 
= π0   +   
1
Q
qq
q


  µ2 t-q   and π0, π qq   > 0, ∑ π qq < 1. 
ARCH-3-M-ECM diagnostics: a. Ljung-Box Portmanteau (Q) test for white noise of the errors. The 
null hypothesis is white noise. Q-Statistic = 29.1969, p-value = 0.8979; the error is white noise. b. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticy. The null hypothesis is a constant variance. 
p-value = 0.3772; the variance is constant. Breusch-Geoffrey LM test of autocorrelation of the errors. 
The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. p-value = 0.217. c. Ramsey test of omitted variables, 
which has a null hypothesis of no omitted variables. p-value = 0.409 so no attenuation bias. Dummy 
variable are insignificant so coefficients and statistics are omitted. 
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Further evidence that the futures market is long-run unbiased and efficient is provided in Table 
2.1. Table 2.1 displays results of the second test of market efficiency using the two-month 
forecast horizon: Davidson and MacKinnon (1981)’s non-nested J–type test to discriminate 
between an ECM with (equation 5) and without (equation 4) long-run unbiasedness and efficiency 
conditions imposed.  Results in Table 2.1 (sub-division 3) using the two-month horizon indicate 
that the cocoa futures market is long-run unbiased and efficient assuming a zero constant risk 
premium since model (5) is selected over model (4). This can be seen from careful analysis of the 
information provided in the third (3) horizontal sub-divisions of Table 2.1.  The third sub-division 
of Table 2.1 shows that with a p-value of 0.089 we fail to reject the restrictions of zero long-run 
constant risk premium and market unbiasedness in the ECM context.  
 Failure to reject the null hypothesis of long-run market efficiency and unbiasedness does 
not necessarily imply short-run efficiency and unbiasedness.  To test short-run market efficiency 
and for a risk premium we exclusively use the two-month horizon because the five-month 
maturity contract yields insufficient data.  
 To test for a time-varying risk premium, we first tested for evidence of non-constancy in 
the variance of the ECM using LM ARCH tests.  A non-constant variance points to bias in the 
short run which may be caused by the presence of a time-varying risk premium. Results in Table 
2.2 indicate the presence of a significant ARCH-3 term which means that the conditional variance 
is non-constant.  However, again, since the non-negativity constraint is violated a time-varying 
risk premium cannot be confirmed. We thus focus on the results of tests for short-run market 
efficiency and unbiasedness and for a time–varying risk premium using the ECM. Results of tests 
performed using the ARCH-3-M-ECM are reported strictly for the purposes of comparison. Note 
that similar to the procedure in McKenzie and Holt (2002), the conditions for long-run market 
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conditions for unbiasedness, efficiency and for a zero risk premium were imposed in the ECM 
prior to testing for efficiency and for a risk premium but results are largely identical to results 
from the unrestricted model.   
From Column 2, Table 2.3, the non-constant variance identified in Table 2.2 does not 
contribute to a time-varying risk premium because θ, the coefficient of the conditional variance 
term, is insignificant. This implies although we found an ARCH effect (albeit with an unexpected 
sign), it was not significant in the mean equation.  The finding of a zero risk premium is not 
surprising because ARCH-type effects are usually found in data with extremely high frequency. 
Lower frequency data smooth the series rendering it difficult to capture the ARCH-type effect that 
measure the risk premium (Frank and Garcia, 2009). Interestingly, Subahuro and Larue (1997) 
and Frank and Garcia (2009) also find no risk premiums in futures markets using the two-month 
horizon for different commodities although short-run biases were sometimes present. 
We test for and reject short-run market efficiency and unbiasedness using the ECM and tests 
derived by McKenzie and Holt (2002); the results are presented in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.4 Tests of Short-Run Market Efficiency, Unbiasedness and Risk Premium: Two-       
Month Horizon 
 
 
ρ = 1 α1 = 1 θ = 0
ρα1 = 1 ψ1 = 1
ψ1 = 1 ψi = 0 for j not = 1
Ωi = Ωj = 0; i, j not = 1 Ωi =  0
θ = 0
m = 0 m = 0
P-Value for chi-square 0.0 0.00015 0.125
Conclusion Reject Ho: Reject Ho: Do not reject the null  
 
(1) The short-run conditions for short-run market inefficiency and unbiasedness given long-run 
market efficiency and unbiasedness can also be found in McKenzie and Holt (2002). 
(2) Column 1 contains the results of tests of short-run market efficiency, column 2 contains results 
of the test of short-run unbiasedness, and column 3  contains the results of the test for the 
identification of the Risk Premium. 
 
Although the finding of co-integration of cash and futures price suggests long-run unbiased 
futures forecasts of subsequent prices, Table 2.4 provides evidence of short-run bias and market 
inefficiency or informational inefficiency in the ECM, since the null hypotheses of short-run 
market efficiency and unbiasedness are rejected. The futures market is biased in the short run (See 
Column 1, Table 2.4), but it is most likely that the bias emerges from an informational 
inefficiency because there is no time-varying risk premium (θ is insignificant). The insignificance 
of θ provides evidence of an insignificant time-varying risk premium. However, evidence of a 
zero constant risk premium is also immediately available since α, the constant is zero in the long 
run relationship (Table 2.1) so there is no constant risk premium in the long run. Since the 
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constant in the short-run relationship also is zero there is no constant risk premium in either the 
long or short runs. 
Confirmation of short-run futures market inefficiency is provided by the test of short-run 
market inefficiency.  From the results in column 1, Table 2.4, the null hypothesis that the futures 
market is efficient in the short-run is rejected, so the short-run bias is due to (informational) 
inefficiency, not a time-varying or constant risk premium. 
 
 
2.6 OUT-OF-SAMPLE ANALYSIS 
 
 In light of the results of short-run market inefficiency, it is important to assess out-of-
sample forecast accuracy of futures prices relative to the ECM, and to estimate the magnitude of 
the inefficiency.  This is vital because all the efficiency tests carried out so far used in-sample data 
and were predicated on the necessary condition for market efficiency (Fama, 1970) although the 
sufficient condition for efficiency is positive, economically relevant risk-adjusted profit. Before 
we move to the sufficiency criterion, however, it is instructive to note that stronger formal tests of 
efficiency using the necessary condition and out of sample data are available. Out of sample 
analysis is typically more robust relative to in-sample results. We discuss two of such tests below 
as a check for our in-sample results.  
  
The Test of Forecast Encompassing and the MDM Test 
 To formally assess out-of-sample forecast accuracy, two procedures were used: A 
regression-based test of forecast encompassing used by Sanders and Manfredo (2005), and the 
Modified Diebold and Mariano’s or the MDM test. The futures forecasts were used as the 
preferred forecasts in both tests. A plot of the 21 forecasts generated using both futures and the 
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ECM from 1980.1 to 2008.1 (since there are 5 contracts in a month) are presented in Figure 2.3. 
The forecasts are visually similar albeit with some divergences. 
 
Figure 2.3 A Plot of the ECM Forecast and Futures Forecast of Prices ($/ton) 
 
 
Both the encompassing test and the MDM tests assess pricing efficiency (Sanders and 
Manfredo, 2005). Pricing efficiency as defined here is equivalent to informational efficiency. 
There are two dimensions to assessing pricing efficiency: (i) are there other forecasts that are 
more accurate than the preferred forecast or the futures (necessary condition)? and (ii) if so, do 
these other forecasts allow us to generate risk adjusted profits (the sufficient condition).   
 The encompassing and the MDM tests are used in the first step, to assess the necessary 
condition but not the sufficient efficiency condition and imply that the forecast error of the 
preferred forecast must be orthogonal to all variables in the information set, especially the 
forecast error of the competing forecasts (Kaminsky and Kumar, 1990; MH, 2002; Sanders and 
Manfredo, 2005). 
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Mechanics of the Test of Forecast Encompassing and the Link to the MDM 
 As MH (2002) explain, whether the futures forecast error is orthogonal to the variables in 
the information set can be tested by the simple regression equation in (i)  
(i) St-ft-n = α + βX t-n+ εt  
where St is the cash price (or alternatively the expiration day futures price), ft-n is the futures 
forecast price, n periods prior to expiration and Xt-n is a vector of information- containing 
variables. In particular, suppose we choose the futures forecast as the preferred forecast.  Then if 
we assume that Xt-n is an alternative forecast ft-n
a
 to the preferred forecast (the futures), the null 
hypothesis of market efficiency will posit that β = 0 in regression (ii) below: 
     (ii)  ft-ft-n = α + β (ft- ft-n
a) + εt. . 
By performing a simple mathematical exercise involving adding and subtracting the alternative 
forecast ft-n
a
 from (ii) we arrive at equation (iii)  
    (iii)   e1t = α + λ (e1t –e2t ) + εt. 
where e1t is the future’s forecast error or the difference between the futures forecast price and the 
futures price at expiration and e2t is the alternate forecast error or the difference between the 
alternative forecast (the ECM) and the futures price at expiration. Coincidentally, equation (iii) is 
precisely is precisely Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold’s (1998) test for forecast encompassing 
and is theoretically consistent.  
 A test of the null hypothesis, λ = 0, in equation (iii) is a test of the null that that the 
covariance between e1t and (e1t − e2t) = 0. A failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that a 
composite forecast cannot be constructed from the two series that would result in a smaller 
expected squared error than using the preferred forecast (the futures) by itself. In this case, the 
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preferred forecast is said to encompass the alternative forecast. The preferred forecast is 
“conditionally efficient” (Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold, 1998). 
 The MDM and encompassing tests have the same null hypothesis: that the forecast error 
of the preferred forecast must be orthogonal to the forecast error of the competing forecast. A non 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the preferred (futures) encompass the competing 
forecast and establishes efficiency for both tests. The difference between the two tests is that 
MDM test is more powerful than the regression based encompassing test in small samples 
(Sanders and Manfredo, 2005).  
 Note that the futures forecast or the preferred forecast recorded a larger loss functions 
(MSE) compared to the ECM forecast which was the competing forecast so the futures is less 
likely to provide more accurate forecasts relative to the ECM.  As Sanders and Manfredo (2005) 
explain, however, in determining pricing efficiency, results of tests of encompassing are preferred 
to comparison of forecasts using the lower MSE criterion. In performing the encompassing tests, 
the residuals of all regressions were tested to ensure that they were white noise. If the errors in the 
encompassing regressions were not white noise then the encompassing test results would have 
been invalid. 
 Results from both the regression-based encompassing test and the MDM test both suggest 
that futures forecasts is inefficient in the short run using the necessary condition for futures 
market efficiency as a criterion. As previously stated, Twenty-one out-of-sample forecasts 
(2004.1-2008.1) were generated from the ECM and used to perform the tests. Using the ECM 
forecast, the p-values of the regression-based encompassing test and MDM tests were respectively 
0.001 and 0.003, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis in both tests.  
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 Different loss functions for example, the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the Mean 
Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) were employed in the MDM test, but the primary conclusion that 
futures did not encompass alternative forecasts was consistent across type of loss function used. 
Since futures fails to encompass the ECM forecast, the futures market is informationally 
inefficient in the short run by the encompassing criterion.  
 To assess the magnitude of the inefficiency in the futures market, we calculate the return 
and standard deviation from a buy (sell) and offset strategy when the alternative forecast price is 
above (below) the futures’ forecast.  The average profit and standard deviation from the simple 
buy (sell) and offset strategy for the ECM forecast are $37.05/ton and $207.4/ton, respectively. 
The mean percent return was 2.5 and its standard deviation was 0.12. In calculating returns, we 
use 10% of the futures contract price as the cost of holding the futures position or the initial 
margin (Lukac, Brorson and Irwin, 1988). We subtract this from the futures at expiration to obtain 
the return. The corresponding annualized positive returns of 4.2 suggest market inefficiency.   
 On the surface the annualized positive returns of 4.2% seems very large but considered in 
the light that only 10% of the initial futures position is counted as cost the return is much less 
impressive. In fact, while the average percentage return is positive, it is doubtful any investor will 
invest in cocoa futures unless it is economically relevant. To examine this more carefully, we 
calculate the most commonly used measure of risk-adjusted return, the Sharpe ratio (see Sharpe, 
1966; 1975 and 1994), using the interest paid for a three-month U.S Treasury bill. Traditionally, 
the risk-free rate of return used in computing the Sharpe ratio is the shortest dated government T-
bill (i.e. U.S. T-Bill). Note that the Federal Reserve does not report the yield on a two-month 
treasury bill, which is our relevant forecast horizon. The Treasury bill held for the shortest time is 
the three-month note. We therefore calculated the Sharpe ratio using the interest paid for a three-
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month Treasury bill (CNN Money, October 2008). The Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio of the 
difference between expected and market returns to the standard deviation of the expected return 
(Sharpe, 1966; 1975 and 1994). We computed the Sharpe ratio in two steps: In step 1, we subtract 
the market return from the average of the returns computed from the buy and hold strategy. In 
Step 2 we divide the value obtained in step 1 by the standard deviation of expected returns (from 
the buy and hold strategy) and obtained a Sharpe ratio value of 0.27. This value of the Sharpe 
ratio is quite low and likely to be very unattractive to most investors because the risk associated 
per unit of return is disproportionately large (Sharpe, 1994). A Sharpe ratio less (more) than one 
implies that for every unit of return above the market rate an investor must accept risk 
considerably larger (smaller) than market risk.  
 Further, once the returns are adjusted for transaction and transportation costs they might 
yield a zero or negative value, making a strategy to invest in cocoa futures extremely unlikely.
 
The transactions cost comprises of both a fixed cost which declines with number of contracts and 
a cost per contract (brokerage fee), so it can be substantial. Since the risk premium is zero, a value 
of the transactions cost equal to the risk adjusted positive return (the Sharpe ratio) will 
immediately drive profits to zero invalidating the need to invest in futures contracts.   
 To keep the argument balanced however, recall that the Sharpe ratio penalizes all 
variability in the revenue returns as risk and not just losses of revenue as the measure of risk 
(standard deviation) is not a downside risk measure but rather a two-sided risk measure.  The 
Sharpe ratio may therefore over-state the effect of risk in the return versus comparison used to 
calculate the Sharpe ratio. This is true because it is plausible that some investors may really prefer 
upside return movements because this logically translates into profit and not risk (Mattos, Garcia 
and Pennings, 2008).   
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 Although it appears there are systematic patterns in cocoa prices, and that alternative 
forecasts do provide information to the futures market, it is difficult to take advantage of them in 
an ex ante context so the magnitude of the short-run inefficiency is small and should not deter 
effective hedging. We have reasonable confidence in the results as we did not notice any extreme 
outliers in the forecasts. While the necessary condition for market inefficiency is satisfied because 
returns from the buy and hold strategy are positive, the sufficient condition for market 
inefficiency is not achieved as the positive returns are economically irrelevant. These results are 
consistent with the notion that high volatility in agricultural markets makes forecasting 
problematic and identification of profitable strategies difficult.  
 We note here that the apparent inconsistency between the encompassing test results that 
specify inefficiency and the profit analysis that specify efficiency is no inconsistency at all. The 
clarification needed here is that the encompassing test only satisfies the necessary condition for 
efficiency so the finding of positive profit is actually consistent with market inefficiency. Sanders 
and Manfredo (2005) also reported inconsistency between encompassing and profit analysis 
results, so it is not a surprising occurrence. However similar to what is reported here they 
emphasize that the encompassing test is an insufficient test of efficiency. Association of gross 
profit with the encompassing test result of inefficiency is valuable, because it provides some 
statistical support for the results of the statistical test of short-run inefficiency and unbiasedness 
conducted within the framework of the time series model (Sanders and Manfredo, 2005).  
The finding of economically irrelevant profit here, however, is in line with the sufficient 
condition for efficiency.  
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 The futures market is one way Sub-Saharan Africa’s cocoa exporters can hedge export 
price risk. However, efficient hedging is compromised if futures markets are inefficient, and 
costly if speculators demand a significant constant or time-varying risk premium to bear spot 
price risk. Using two and five-month hedge horizons we find that the cash and futures prices are 
co-integrated and that the futures market is unbiased and efficient in the long run.  The result of 
co-integration is consistent with the results of Beck (1994) and Subahuro and Larue (1997) but 
not with Manayi and Struthers (1997). Long-run market efficiency and unbiasedness implies that 
it is feasible for SSA exporters to hedge price risk with futures markets because futures prices 
provide accurate forecasts of the subsequent period cash price.   
 In contrast, the futures market is found to be short-run biased using a two-month horizon 
by the necessary condition for futures market efficiency. Short-run bias may be caused by 
informational inefficiency or a risk premium. Decomposing short-futures bias into bias caused by 
risk premiums or informational inefficiency has proven challenging in the literature (Frank and 
Garcia, 2009). We employed McKenzie and Holt’s procedure and NYBOT futures to identify 
short-run bias, inefficiency and the absence of both a constant and a time-varying risk premium in 
the cocoa futures market. The absence of a risk premium is consistent with Frank and Garcia 
(2009). Our initial finding of limited short-run futures market inefficiency by the necessary 
criterion is in is in line with the findings of Manayi and Struthers (1997). We find that short-run 
futures market bias is due to an information bias and not to a time-varying risk premium. Further, 
although it may be possible to exploit the informational inefficiency to make money in the short-
run, substantial inherent market risk makes investing in cocoa futures unattractive. Since short-
run informational inefficiency only yields economically irrelevant profit when considered on a 
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risk adjusted basis the futures market is actually efficient by the sufficient condition for 
efficiency. 
 The primary conclusion that the futures market is long-run unbiased and efficient should 
be welcome news to SSA governments desiring to use the futures markets for hedging export 
price risk, as futures market efficiency is a necessary condition to hedge export price risk with 
futures markets. The absence of a time-varying or constant risk premium is one less unobserved 
cost that hedgers need to consider in deciding to hedge export price risk. A zero risk premium 
together with both short and long-run market efficiency and unbiasedness suggests that export 
price risk hedging with cocoa futures markets is a feasible option for Sub-Saharan Africa cocoa 
exporters. 
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ESSAY 3: HEDGING JOINT PRICE AND PRODUCTION RISK: THE CASE OF GHANA 
COCOA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 SUMMARY  
 
This paper assesses the usefulness of risk hedging on futures markets for a cocoa exporter subject 
to concurrent price and output (revenue) risks. The analysis is conducted for Ghana, the world’s 
second largest exporter of cocoa beans. Using cocoa export revenue data, the cocoa exporter’s 
utility maximization problem (UMP) is solved using a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
utility function which displays risk vulnerability, a natural restriction on preferences. Simulation 
results from the utility maximization problem indicate that as a result of production risk, optimal 
revenue hedge ratios are much smaller than optimal price risk hedge ratios for reasonable values 
of the risk parameter. When transaction costs are incorporated, optimal revenue hedge ratios 
decline further although they remain positive verifying previous findings. The findings generated 
here in the context of a commodity framework indicate limited hedging with futures contracts by 
Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board may be warranted. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
    Governments of cocoa exporting Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries typically depend 
heavily on cocoa export revenue to finance development projects (Borenstein, Jeane and Sandri, 
2009; Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako, and Grynberg, 2007). Export revenue variability emanating 
from either price or production instability can lead to undesirable consequences for exporters 
largely dependent on a narrow range of commodities (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Razzaque, 
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Osafo-Kwaako, and Grynberg, 2007).  For instance, export revenue risk can increase the 
likelihood of default on sovereign debt and also lead to macroeconomic instability in export 
revenue-dependent countries (Malone, 2005). 
 This paper focuses on the export revenue risk problem facing Ghana, the second largest 
cocoa exporter in the world. Ghana is chosen for analysis because it is somewhat typical of the 
cocoa exporting SSA countries and relies heavily on cocoa exports; cocoa provides nearly thirty 
percent of Ghana’s export revenue (Pinnamang-Tutu and Armah, 2011). 
 Export revenue risk has assumed great importance recently because non-market strategies 
including buffer stocks, buffer funds and commodity agreements failed to effectively reduce 
revenue risk (Borenstein, Jeane, and Sandri, 2009; Larson, Anderson, and Verangis, 2004). 
Further, because of the recent efforts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to liberalize 
markets and foster competition in world markets, risk management methods such as international 
cocoa agreements and buffer stocks are not likely to be encouraged in the future (Lence, 2009; 
Borenstein, Jeane, and Sandri, 2009). As an alternative, market-based risk management strategies 
including hedging may be used to manage export revenue risk. 
 Like Ghana, the majority of SSA’s major cocoa exporters administer exports through 
legislatively defined cocoa marketing boards although the largest cocoa producer (Cote d’Ivoire) 
has partly liberalized the export of cocoa. Given the structure of cocoa marketing in SSA, this 
research examines whether a centralized marketing board like Ghana’s COCOBOD can use 
futures markets to mitigate revenue risk.  In particular, the paper seeks to answer to the following 
questions: (i) Should Ghana use the futures markets to mitigate price and output (revenue) risks? 
(ii) Will futures hedging of revenue risk increase exporter’s welfare relative to the unhedged 
position? (iii) How large should optimal hedge ratios be after accounting for transaction costs 
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which have been shown in prior research to affect their attractiveness? Answers to these questions 
can provide information on the effectiveness of futures markets in hedging revenue risk.   
 Ghana differs from other African cocoa producers (Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), Togo, Cameroon, 
Nigeria and Uganda) because it produces the world’s highest quality cocoa and thus enjoys a 
significant quality premium.  At the moment Ghana does not hedge but rather sells all its cocoa 
mainly to European buyers using forward contracts which recognize the differential quality of 
Ghana-origin cocoa (the Golden Pod).  
The COCOBOD reports negligible cocoa trading activity between Ghana and USA 
merchants. The reason for the low Ghana-USA cocoa trade is that USA chocolate manufacturers 
(e.g. Hershey) do not specialize in making chocolate with a large proportion of high quality beans 
and are thus unwilling to pay the premium for Ghana cocoa. Trade in cocoa between Ghana and 
USA also is less attractive because of the relatively high shipping costs which can reach three 
times the rate that exists between Ghana and Europe (e.g., Ghana-UK $250/ton compared to 
Ghana-US $750/ton, COCOBOD). Despite reports of limited cocoa trading between Ghana and 
the USA, there is no a priori reason why Ghana cannot hedge on the New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) futures market if its utility as a producer country is enhanced by hedging on the 
NYBOT. 
 In a well-known paper, Rolfo (1980) analyzed the Utility Maximization Problem (UMP) 
facing a cocoa exporting country exposed to simultaneous price and production (revenue) risk, 
both of which plague cocoa producing countries. Rolfo (1980) focused on SSA’s major cocoa 
exporters—Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), and Nigeria—which combined account for nearly 
seventy percent of world production and depend to varying degrees on cocoa export revenues to 
fund development (Gibson, 2007).  
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 Rolfo’s problem formulation described a sovereign cocoa exporter exposed to concurrent 
price and production risk or revenue risk taking a pre-harvest (September) position in the futures 
market to establish a price at harvest (March). In the absence of production risk, a traditional 
recommendation of protecting a long position in a physical market involves taking a short 
position of equal size in the futures market (Hieronymus, 1971; Rolfo, 1980). Given production 
risk, Rolfo (1980) finds limited or no use of the futures markets is superior to a full hedge.  
 While Rolfo’s analysis is highly informative, his findings may be limited in several 
dimensions. In particular in his analysis of the UMP facing the Ghana COCOBOD, he does not 
address the existence of the Ghana-origin cocoa quality premium nor does he identify why the 
COCOBOD should hedge given that it was already selling cocoa by forward contracts. Further, 
since his data covered the period 1956 to 1976, the results reflect price and production dynamics 
which may no longer be relevant for current hedging decisions. The New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) futures and subsequent spot (cash) prices measured in nominal $/ton, and variance of 
futures prices for cocoa from 1960 to 2008 (shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 on the next page) 
provide clear evidence of a structural break in these variables around 1978. The earlier period was 
characterized by lower and less variable prices, and by a closer relationship between futures and 
spot prices.  
Figure 3.1 Cash and Futures Cocoa Prices, 1960-2008 
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Figure 3.2 Futures Price Variances, 1960-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistical evidence of a structural break in the variance of futures prices is presented in Table 3.1 
which displays results of the Miller Jackknife test, a non-parametric test of structural change in 
the variance that does not assume equal medians. 
 
Table 3.1 Structural Break Test for the Variance of Cocoa Futures Price  
Structural MI
Break m n Q-Stat P-value
Standard Deviation July
of the Futures Price 1978 18 30 -5.0 <0.001
 
 
Ho: The Ratio of the variances from the two periods is unity 
Ha: Ratio of the variances from the two periods is not unity 
m = number of observations before the break 
n =  number of observations after the break 
MI: Miller jackknife test for differences in variance between two periods. For large m and n, Q 
converges to a standard normal distribution. High Q-Stat is strong evidence of a structural break. 
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From Table 3.1, the null hypothesis that the ratio of the variances of futures price before 
and after 1978 is unity is rejected at 5 % significance level. Since optimal hedge ratios are 
influenced either by changes in the correlation between cash and futures prices or by changes in 
the variance of the futures price (over time), the structural change in 1978 indicates a need to 
reassess the cocoa exporter’s hedging decisions. More importantly, Rolfo’s analysis ignores 
transaction costs. Mattos, Garcia and Nelson (2008) demonstrate that when transaction costs are 
considered when solving the utility maximization problem of an agent, optimal hedge ratios may 
change considerably. 
 Here using futures contracts on the NYBOT, the most liquid cocoa futures market in terms 
of volume of trade, we re-investigate the revenue risk problem facing Ghana, incorporating 
transaction costs and more recent data. Following Rolfo (1980), we first compute optimal hedge 
ratios using quadratic utility with zero transactions costs for different values of the Coefficient of 
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA). Transaction costs are then incorporated into the cocoa 
exporter’s utility maximization problem and the optimal hedge ratios are recalculated. We then 
repeat the analysis with a more realistic Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function 
(Nelson and Escalante, 2004).  
The Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility framework allows for the more reasonable 
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) and Decreasing Absolute Risk Prudence (DAP) 
assumptions. The Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility function also displays risk vulnerability 
which is the most natural restriction on preferences (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Mattos, Garcia and 
Nelson, 2008). A search program in Visual Basic was developed to compute optimal hedge ratios 
by solving the UMP of the cocoa exporter with Nelson and Escalante (2004) type preferences 
exposed to revenue risk and transaction costs. Optimal hedge ratios are positive even when 
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transactions costs and production risks are incorporated into the UMP of the cocoa producer but 
they are small in magnitude.  Thus, the essay finds that hedging appears to offer a small utility-
improving opportunity, suggesting that it may be of value for the cocoa Board to assess the 
usefulness of futures hedging within the structure of its operational decisions and the details of the 
contracts offered by its buyers. 
 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Rolfo maximized logarithmic utility and quadratic utility functions to develop optimal 
hedge ratios from the utility maximization problem. The log utility function displays Constant 
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), a realistic preference representation, but does not allow the risk 
parameter to vary as it is fixed at unity. The log utility assumption is thus restrictive and unlikely 
to be very useful because it does not allow analysis of how the hedge ratios change as the risk 
parameter changes.  
In comparison, the quadratic utility function implies increasing relative risk aversion 
(which means that risky assets are inferior goods) and satiation (which means that the utility starts 
decreasing after a satiation point), both of which are inconsistent with observed behavior (Mattos, 
Nelson and Garcia, 2008; Nelson and Escalante, 2004). However, given quadratic utility, 
preferences can be represented by the mean and variance of the underlying wealth distribution, 
greatly simplifying the utility maximization problem (Rolfo, 1980).  
The simplicity of the computation of the mean-variance hedge (MVH) derived by 
assuming quadratic utility explains its popularity in the literature despite inconsistency with the 
actual behavior of economic agents (Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990; Lence, 1996). 
Although more recent literature no longer assumes preferences with quadratic utility due to its 
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unrealistic properties, the mean-variance model (that is typically implied by quadratic utility) is 
still used assuming CARA utility and normally distributed returns. 
Here, we also employ a CRRA utility function first defined by Nelson and Escalante 
(2004) which is consistent with observed behavior because it displays Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) and Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), Decreasing Absolute Risk 
Prudence (DAP) as well as risk vulnerability. According to Gollier and Pratt (1996) “preferences 
exhibit risk vulnerability if the presence of an exogenous background risk with a non-positive 
mean, namely an unfair risk, raises the aversion to any other independent risk.” In comparison, 
risk prudence refers to the propensity of the individual to save more when faced with riskier 
outcomes and is not identical to risk aversion which means the individual dislikes risk. In 
particular, the utility function of a risk-averse agent has a negative second derivative while the 
utility function of the risk prudent agent has a positive third derivative. DAP therefore means the 
agent is less prudent the wealthier he gets. According to Eeckhoudt and Rey (2011). 
“Vulnerability adds to prudence what DARA adds to risk aversion.” 
CRRA, DARA, DAP and risk vulnerability are desirable characteristics of utility functions 
(Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Nelson and Escalante, 2004; Mattos, Garcia, and Nelson, 2008). Since 
Gollier and Pratt (1996) demonstrate convincingly that risk vulnerability is the most natural 
restriction of utility functions, the Nelson and Escalante (2004) CRRA utility function, which is 
risk vulnerable, is best suited for modeling risk preferences of agents and is employed in this 
research.    
 Apart from unrealistic preferences, changes in the assumptions used to develop optimal 
hedge ratios can influence their magnitude and usefulness (Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha, 1984).  
In particular, when the assumptions underlying the derivation of the mean-variance hedges 
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(MVH) using CARA utility change, MV hedges change dramatically (Lence, 1996). Although 
both Rolfo (1980) and McKinnon (1967)  relax the zero production risk assumption neither takes 
into account how transaction costs, such as brokerage fees, can affect the optimal hedge ratios. 
We relax both assumptions and investigate how production risks and transaction costs 
simultaneously affect the optimal hedge assuming the cocoa exporter has realistic preferences. 
  Following Rolfo (1980), Sy (1990) and Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson (1990) also 
examined the costs and benefits of hedging commodity export revenue risk in a utility framework. 
Sy (1990) compared the relative costs and benefits from hedging the revenue risks of a basket of 
goods (cocoa, coffee and cotton) for La Cote d’Ivoire or the CIV. 
 Sy (1990) focused primarily on the change in utility from hedging price risk when 
production risk is introduced into the standard price risk hedging problem. He then compared the 
gains from minimizing risk using futures markets with gains in utility from mitigating risk using 
stabilization programs. In contrast to Rolfo (1980), Sy (1990) does not define a pre-harvest to 
harvest hedge horizon for his analysis. Instead, he defines an annual export price index as the 
ratio of annual total export revenue to the total export volume. He uses this annual price index 
(the cash) and annual average New York Stock Exchange futures prices from 1973 to 1984 to 
compute MVH ratios by Ordinary Least Squares. Consistent with Rolfo (1980)’s findings, Sy 
(1990) concludes the hedge ratios for mitigating cocoa price risk alone are positive and smaller 
than unity.  
In contrast to Rolfo’s conclusions, Sy (1990) finds that when production risk is 
introduced, the sign of hedge ratios are ex ante unclear. They can be positive or negative 
depending on the joint distribution of futures prices, cash prices and production. However the 
benefits from market risk management exceed the benefits from stabilization policies so CIV 
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would benefit greatly from hedging cocoa market risks. Similar to Rolfo, Sy (1990)’s findings 
may be dated and not necessarily relevant to the contemporary risk management problem that 
SSA cocoa exporters face. Further, Sy (1990) also fails to include and analyze effects of 
transaction costs on the optimal hedge ratios.   
 In terms of objectives, structure and findings, the paper by Alexander, Rauser and Musser 
(1986) comes closest to Rolfo’s paper. Although they analyzed a grain producer in the developed 
world (USA) the authors use a similar simulation method. What Alexander, Rauser and Muser 
(1986) contribute is an analysis of the effect of different financial risks on hedging decisions.  In 
particular they modeled the UMP facing the grain farmer as one of a choice between keeping 
capital locked up in a hedging activity and placing the capital in the bank to earn interest. Not 
surprisingly they conclude that the opportunity cost of not hedging negatively influence hedge 
ratios and that hedge ratios decline the lower the expected market return. 
  Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson’s (1990) research is also relevant here because they use 
a similar method to Rolfo (1980) to analyze a similar problem. Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson 
(1990) investigated the possibility of reducing CIV coffee marketing board’s export revenue risk 
by using futures markets. Following Rolfo (1980), they develop optimal hedge ratios by 
maximizing a quadratic utility function for a coffee exporter exposed to export revenue risk.  
Futures prices from 1973/74 to 1986/87 were collected to generate forecast errors using the coffee 
contract on the New York Sugar, Coffee and Cocoa Exchange (SCCE). Cash prices and output 
forecasts were obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The futures 
forecast price used was the May closing futures reported on the last day of October, while the 
futures price at expiration is the May futures reported on the first day of May. They concluded 
that CIV could reduce revenue risk by 29 percent if it hedged 125 percent of production over the 
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1973/74 to 1986/87 period. Since Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson (1990) suggest that CIV 
should hedge more than total output; CIV derives speculative profits from declining prices over 
the period. However, speculation is an undesirable strategy given their risk minimizing objective. 
Similar to Rolfo (1980) and Sy (1990), Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson (1990) use a CARA 
utility function. Further, like Rolfo (1980) and Sy (1990), Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson 
(1990) do not investigate the effect of transaction costs on the optimal hedge ratio.  
 Borenstein et al (2009) also investigate the UMP facing an agricultural producing country 
exposed to revenue risk.  Although they focused only on price risk, they highlighted another 
utility-enhancing property of hedging not previously considered in detail in the literature (see 
Malone (2005) for an early discussion). Specifically, Borenstein et al (2009) used a dynamic 
optimization model to estimate the welfare gains from hedging against commodity price risk for 
commodity-exporting countries. They consider a small open economy that is exposed to shocks in 
the price of the commodity that it exports. They then compare welfare from two scenarios: a 
baseline no-hedging case to the hedging case where hedging is done using futures contracts. They 
find that hedging provides benefits by:  (i) reducing income volatility and smoothing 
consumption, and (ii) reducing the propensity for the exporting country to hold foreign assets as 
precautionary saving. This paper focuses on the first dimension of benefits although the benefits 
from the precautionary motive are also likely to be substantial since the interest on country debt is 
reduced. 
 In another contribution, Lence (2009) solves the UMP facing an agricultural producer 
such as a cocoa exporter exposed to revenue risk. He investigates whether atomistic producers in 
developing countries should hedge revenue risk using a dynamic model that allows for price to 
influence expected production. He concludes that hedging reduces risk, increases production and 
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lowers price because of a downward sloping demand function. Hedgers "win" when their 
production is small but lose when their production is large. For large hedgers, he finds hedging is 
sub-optimal because it reduces their welfare. However, it is important to recognize that the 
structure of the UMP in Lence (2009) is somewhat different from the problem discussed in this 
paper. Here we investigate the market activities of Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board 
(COCOBOD) which is responsible for exporting cocoa, not the production activities of atomistic 
producers as in Lence (2009).  Producers in Ghana do not sell on the world market, but rather 
they sell to the marketing board at a "fixed price" which means that there is no added risk-
reducing increase in production from the use of futures. Consequently, the reduction in producer 
welfare due to hedging that Lence (2009) identified will not likely be observed here. 
 We contribute to the literature by analyzing the cocoa exporter’s revenue-risk problem as 
originally defined by Rolfo (1980) but using a more nuanced specification of risk preferences in 
the post structural break cocoa market. While we examine Rolfo’s original formulation, we focus 
on a more realistic utility function (Nelson and Escalante, 2004) that exhibits decreasing absolute 
risk aversion (DARA), constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), risk vulnerability and decreasing 
absolute risk prudence (DAP).  Like, Borenstein et al (2009), Rolfo (1980), Sy (1990) and Lence 
(2009), we determine if risk hedging is utility improving compared to the no hedging situation 
when transactions costs are zero. We then analyze the effect of transactions costs on the optimal 
hedge ratio and exporter utility.   
 Despite the extensive literature on minimizing production risk (See for example, Mckinon 
1960; Rolfo, 1980; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Alexander, Muser and Mason, 1986, Outtara, 
Shroeder, and Sorenson, 1990; Lapan and Moschini, 1994, Lence 1996; Agalith, 2006 and Lence, 
2009), this line of research has been criticized by Just, Khantachavana and Just (2010). In 
85 
  
particular Just et al claim the existing literature on production risk (i) cannot discern production 
risk preferences, (ii) cannot discern the factors that relate to production risk preference and (iii) is 
replete with evidence that prior estimations of production risk were incorrect. Note that Just et al 
were concerned with literature on production risk that model producer preferences in formulating 
risk minimization strategies. Since we do not model producer preferences here the concerns raised 
by Just et al are essentially second-order problems from the COCOBOD’s perspective. 
 
3.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION, MODEL AND METHODS 
 Despite export and domestic market liberalization in the 1990’s, a substantial amount of 
the cocoa exported from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is still controlled by governmental agencies 
and not by private agents (Dand, 1999; COCOBOD, 2011). In Ghana, in spite of domestic market 
liberalization in 1994, the government-run Cocoa Marketing Board or COCOBOD remains a 
monopoly exporter of Ghana cocoa (Bulir, 2002). Pinnamang-Tutu and Armah (2011) and 
Appendix B contain further details of the institutional organization of cocoa marketing in Ghana. 
There are several private Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) that can purchase the cocoa directly 
from the farmers but these LBAs must resell all the cocoa to COCOBOD at the Takoradi port for 
export (COCOBOD, 2011; Dand, 1999). Hence, COCOBOD is Ghana’s sole decision maker on 
the marketing and exportation of Ghana cocoa. 
Substantial production variation exists in cocoa harvested and exported due to unexpected 
rainfall patterns, diseases and pest attacks (Rolfo, 1980; COCOBOD, 2000). COCOBOD is 
therefore concerned about production risk and revenue risk. Further, COCOBOD is also 
concerned about the effects of price variability on export revenue  risk because it directly faces 
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the world cocoa prices which exhibit considerable price variability reflecting inelastic demand 
and inelastic supply (Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako, and Grynberg, 2007).   
 To model hedging behavior, we posit that COCOBOD takes a pre-harvest position in the 
futures market in order to guard against unexpected variation in cocoa export revenues emanating 
from price or output risk at harvest. The main Ghanaian cocoa harvest commences in October and 
ends in January. The hedge uses New York Board of Trade (NBYOT) futures contracts and is 
assumed to be placed on the first trading day of July (pre-harvest) and closed on the last trading 
day of December (harvest). This six-month hedge horizon was selected for analysis of the revenue 
risk minimization problem using futures markets because it is both convenient and representative 
of the marketing situation faced by COCOBOD. The NYBOT exchange has five contract months 
in a year: March, May, July, September and December making the July-December hedge horizon 
particularly amenable for analysis. At the decision date (pre-harvest, t = 0), the COCOBOD can 
sell h commodity contracts on the exchange each of which reflects a specific production quantity 
in the futures market at price f.  At harvest (t = 1), COCOBOD can deliver the quantity of cocoa 
specified by the contracts to an identified delivery point which is unusual or can simply 
repurchase cocoa at the random futures price Pf on the exchange. Cash sales are made at the end 
of the hedging period, and COCOBOD will receive that price.  Conceptually, losses in the cash 
market can be recouped in the futures market and vice versa.   
We perform the analysis using historical rather than expectational measures of production 
uncertainty. Production forecasts which were available when Rolfo performed his analysis have 
been discontinued (Gil and Duffus), and the limited number of observations and the presence of a 
structural break in production makes the usefulness of other forecast methods (e.g., ARIMA) 
limited. 
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 Following Rolfo (1980), the formulation distinguishes between the random actual cash 
prices (P) when the hedge is lifted, and prices recorded on the futures exchange, f and Pf. P is the 
stochastic cash price received by COCOBOD and reflects world cocoa cash prices plus a quality 
premium specified in the forward contracts offered by the European buyers. Both futures contract 
settlement price and the cash prices are used in computing optimal joint price-output hedge ratios. 
The revenue function of the cocoa exporter exposed to simultaneous price and output risks in the 
absence of transaction costs is defined in (1), 
(1) ( )fR PQ h f P   , 
where Q is the random quantity, h is the futures position, f is the futures price on the day the 
hedge is placed and Pf is the futures settlement price recorded on the last trading day. The returns 
or cocoa export revenue, R, are the sum of the returns in the cash market, and the returns the 
exporter realizes from transactions in the futures markets. When transaction costs are 
incorporated, the revenue function in (1) can be re-written as in (2), 
(2) ( )fR PQ h f P b    , 
where b in (2) is the transaction costs in the form of per unit brokerage fees. The utility 
maximization problem (UMP) of the Ghana cocoa marketing board is modeled first with 
quadratic utility then with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function U (.) where U 
(.)’ > 0, U’’ < 0, and the utility function is concave. Utility is defined as a function of export 
revenue (R).   
The Cocoa Exporter with Quadratic (Mean-Variance) Utility Function 
 Quadratic utility which implies mean-variance preferences has extensive theoretical and 
empirical application in the literature (Peck, 1975; Rolfo, 1980; Chavas and Pope, 1982; Kahl, 
1983; Alexander, Muser, and Mason, 1986; Lence, 1996, 2009). It is popular because of its 
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simplicity. The UMP with quadratic utility function is given in (3) where h, the futures position, is 
the choice variable in COCOBOD’s Utility Maximization Problem. 
        (3) Max: ))(())(()))(()),(((
22
hRhRhRhREU RRRR    =  
E[ 2[ ( )] {[ ( ) [ ( )]}f f fE PQ h f P b E PQ h f P b E PQ h f P b           ], and 
( ( ))R R h  and
2( ( ))R R h are respectively the mean and variance of export revenue and 
  is the 
risk parameter (the coefficient of relative risk aversion or CRRA). The optimal futures position 
obtained by solving (3) is given in (4)  
  (4) 2 2cov [ , ] / [( ) / 2 ]f Pf f Pfh ariance PQ P E f P b      , where
2
Pf is the variance of 
Pf.  In equations (3) and (4), E is the mathematical expectation operator so the expected value of 
stochastic cocoa exporter revenue is, E(R) = ))(( hRR = [ ( )]fE PQ h f P b    and the variance 
of stochastic revenue is )))((
2
hRR  = 
2{[ ( ) [ ( )]}f fE PQ h f P b E PQ h f P b       .  For 
clarity of presentation, in solving for h from the maximization of expected utility, we leave out 
the overall expectation sign (E) because the utility itself is a function of mean and variances 
which are also defined using the expectation (E) sign.  However the computations are done with 
the correct expression of expected utility.    
  The first component of h in (4) is the pure revenue hedge, the coefficient of Pf in a linear 
regression where PQ is the dependent variable and Pf is the independent variable (Rolfo, 1980). 
The pure hedge is independent of the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter. However it does 
crucially depend on the sign of the correlation between output and the futures price at expiration 
with a positive correlation supportive of a hedge (Alexander, Muser, and Mason, 1986). The 
second term is the bias in futures price (Rolfo, 1980) less transaction costs. This bias (also called 
the speculative part of the hedge) is included for completeness but may be zero if risk aversion is 
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extremely high or if the market is efficient. If this speculative component is non-zero its magnitude 
depends on the risk aversion parameter. When transaction costs are zero, (4) is identical to Rolfo 
(1980)’s derivation.  
 
Cocoa Exporter with Nelson Escalante (2004) Utility Function 
 Nelson and Escalante (2004) demonstrated that when the joint distribution of cash and 
futures returns are elliptically symmetric and final wealth satisfies the location-scale condition, 
expected utility can be written as a function of the first two moments of the return distribution 
(Chamberlain, 1983; and Meyer, 1987). We verified that final wealth satisfied the location-scale 
condition in the objective function developed using Nelson and Escalante’s (2004) utility 
function. We used the Jacque-Bera test to ensure normality of returns as normality is an accepted 
form of elliptical symmetry. We thus maximize the expected utility of the Nelson and Escalante 
CRRA location-scale utility function as in (5) 
(5)Max: )))((())((/(1)))(()),(((
222 hRhRhRhREU RRRR   .  
 
To maximizing (5), we simply maximize its denominator since both operations give the same 
answer. To identify h as the explicit choice variable, we re-write (5) as an explicit function of h 
and then maximize the denominator of the resulting function where h is the choice variable (6). 
(6) Max: )))(())(((
22 hRhR RR    = 
2 2( [( ( )) [( ( ) [ ( )]] )E R h E R h E R h  = 
2 2[ ( )] {[ ( ) [ ( )]}f f fE PQ h f P b E PQ h f P b E PQ h f P b           . 
Let 2( ( )))R R h  be defined as in (7) 
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(7) 2( ( )))R R h = E[R (h)-E(R (h))]
2 
=  
2[ ( )] [ ]]fE PQ h P f b E PQ hb     .
 
We can then solve the utility function in (8) for h, the optimal hedge position. 
(8) Max 2 2[ ( )] {[ ( ) [ ( )]}f f fE PQ h P f b E PQ h P f b E PQ h P f b           . 
A closed form solution to (8) can be obtained as long as we assume a zero basis (i.e., assuming Pf 
= P) and is included in Appendix C. When we allow for non-zero basis, a more realistic case, a 
closed form solution is difficult to obtain but a search procedure similar to that employed by 
Rolfo (1980) and described in the next section can be developed to determine h, the optimal 
futures position and H, the optimal hedge ratio.   
 
The Optimal Hedge Ratio When Basis Risk Is Present 
In the presence of basis risk (Pf ≠ P), a search program was written in Visual Basic to solve 
for optimal hedge ratios. The search program uses the following algorithm: First set transaction 
costs, b = 0. For each pre-determined level of the hedge ratio (H = h / μQ) between 0 and 1 in 
steps of 0.01, obtain the value of the utility function for the twenty-eight observations from t = 1 
(1980) to t = 28 (2008). Next sum the twenty-eight values and divide by twenty-eight to get the 
expected value of the utility function over the period for that value of H.  Repeat the calculations 
for each value of H from 0.01…1.0. The value of H between 0 and 1 (0.01, 0.02…1.0) that 
corresponds to the highest expected value of the utility function over the period is the optimal 
hedge ratio.  By repeating the search over the range of H values the optimal hedge can be found 
for different risk parameter values.  
To identify the effects of transaction costs, b is included and changed and the process is 
repeated. The optimal hedge ratio corresponding to each level of transactions costs can then be 
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compared to the optimal hedge ratios when b = 0 and those obtained from the MVH to determine 
how robust optimal joint hedge ratios are to changes in transaction costs and to preference type. 
For each pair of values of H and b, the expected utility can be computed and compared to the 
expected utility where H = 0 and when both H and b have zero values. This enables a comparison 
of the utilities of a hedged and unhedged exporter given the presence or absence of transaction 
costs. 
 
3.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Transaction costs  
 Transaction costs can include a number of factors including information costs, monitoring 
costs, and actual monetary costs of trading related to brokerage fees.  Transactions costs are 
modeled as brokerage fees, which constitute the largest component of transactions costs. Here we 
examine six levels of brokerage fees in $/ton (0, 10, 50, 100, 200, and 500). The likely range of 
brokerage fees that COCOBOD will face is between $0 and $100 per ton. However transactions 
costs incorporate huge start up fixed costs and other financial requirements which when spread 
over the total number of contracts purchased will increase the transactions cost per contract 
significantly. For example, there are costs associated with training the risk managers at the 
marketing board to use the futures market. Alternatively a foreign risk management firm could be 
contracted but either option is expensive. We therefore use $500/ton as the cut off point for 
transactions costs.  Brokerage fees have been declining over the years and can normally be 
negotiated downward for large volume futures participants such as the COCOBOD. Brokerage 
fees vary depending on whether the hedge is large or small or whether the hedger wants full 
service or a per round term transaction. A very large prospective hedger such as the COCOBOD 
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can obtain between 25 and 60 dollars per ton. Smaller hedgers will pay substantially more in 
brokerage fees per ton.  
 
Cash, Futures and Futures at Expiration Data 
 Hedge horizons were set at December to be consistent with Ghana’s October-January, 
cocoa harvest season (COCOBOD, 2000). Cocoa futures and output data from 1980-2008 were 
obtained respectively from the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) and the Ghana cocoa 
marketing board (COCOBOD). The NYBOT was used because it is liquid and because the cocoa 
contract traded has specifications that are compatible with the cocoa SSA countries export.  As 
will be explained later, however, almost no Ghanaian cocoa sells in NY because of high transport 
costs and quality premium.  
 Table 3.2 (on the next page) contains summary statistics for cocoa production and revenue 
for Ghana as well as for the futures and spot prices used in the research. The standard deviations 
of prices, revenue and production (assumed to reflect exports since in-country storage is minimal) 
indicate that there is substantial price, production and revenue risk. Further, the mean of the cash 
prices received by COCOBOD for delivery (1775.4) exceeds both the mean of July futures 
forecast price (1514.2), and the mean of the futures price for December expiration (1553.2).  
These differences are likely indicative of the premium paid by buyers for Ghana’s premium 
cocoa. Also, note that since the mean of the futures price at expiration is greater than the July 
futures forecast price, the optimal hedge is an increasing function of the risk parameter (Outtara, 
Schroeder, and Sorenson, 1990).   
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for Annual Prices, Production and Revenues, Ghana, 1980-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Correlations and Covariances between Cash and Futures Prices, 1980-2008 
 
 Futures price Cash price Futures at expiration
Futures price 1
( 194477)
Cash price 0.86 1
( 171581) (205861)
Futures at 0.9 0.96 1
expiration ( 174761) (205861) ( 195679)  
Variance and Covariances are in parentheses.   
 
 
 At $222, the basis at contract expiration is unusually large, about 12.5 percent of the spot 
price. This basis ($222/ton) is primarily due to separate quality premiums paid for all West 
African cocoa and for Ghanaian cocoa in particular because Ghana cocoa is the world’s highest 
quality cocoa. The NYBOT offers quality premiums of $160/ton for West African cocoa but does 
not differentiate among the different types of West Africa cocoa (Ghana, CIV, Togo, Nigeria, 
Cameroon and Benin). Gilbert (2009) suggests that Ghanaian cocoa draws a premium of 3 to 5 
percent relative to CIV and other West African cocoa in forward contracts.  Assuming the futures 
price is reflective of the world market price, the Ghanaian price reflects the futures price at 
expiration ($1553) plus the quality premium paid to other West African producers ($160), and the 
Production (* 1000 tonnes) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ghana 498.85 69.79 360.05 653.32
Random Revenue (*$1000)
Ghana 885640.8 281240.4 353567.6 1301458
Prices ($) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash 1775.37 453.72 890 2690
Futures at Expiration 1553.22 441 877 2469
Futures Forecast 1514.22 440.36 692 2513
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added premium identified by Gilbert. This leads to an average Ghanaian price of $1781.52/ton 
[(1553+160) x 1.04] which is quite close to the $1775.40 reported by the Board. 
The standard deviation of futures prices is smaller than that for spot prices, a favorable 
occurrence for very risk-averse agents and very volatile markets such as the cocoa market. This is 
because when the futures are less risky than the cash price, risk management using futures 
contracts is typically more effective. Table 3.3 contains results of correlation and covariance 
between the futures price, the futures price at expiration and the random spot price. It is clear that 
the futures at expiration are strongly correlated with the spot price. Correlation between all prices 
is high ranging from 0.9 to 1.  This strong correlation between the futures at expiration and spot 
prices from the forward contracts suggests that hedging can still be an effective management tool 
despite a price premium or basis of $222/ton paid for Ghanaian cocoa.   
  
3.5 RESULTS 
Table 3.4 Optimal Hedge Ratios at Different Values of the Risk Parameter for Quadratic Utility 
for Ghana as a Cocoa Exporter 
 
Risk Aversion b=0
Parameter (γ) Ghana
∞ 0.44
1000 0.44
100 0.44
10 0.44
4 0.44
3 0.44
2 0.44
1 0.44
0.1 0.44
0.01 0.44
0.001 0.43
0.0001 0.41
0.00001 0.12
0.0000001 -1.00
0.00000001 -1.01
Cash hedge 0.82
Pure Revenue Hedge 0.44  
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 Results presented here come from the analysis with de-trended revenue and non-detrended 
futures prices but are not much different from when no de-trending is done or when both cash and 
futures are de-trended.  The pure price hedge (minimum variance hedge), computed at infinite risk 
aversion, zero production risk and zero transaction costs which is measured as the coefficient of 
the futures price from the regression of cash on futures is 0.82 as shown in Table 3.4.  This 
means, faced with just price risk, a typical cocoa exporter like Ghana should hedge 82% of output 
in order to obtain a level utility from export revenue greater than the unhedged position (zero 
hedge). Table 3.4 also displays optimal “revenue hedge ratios” for Ghana using quadratic utility 
for values of the risk parameter γ between 0.000000001 and ∞ which represent the range from a 
risk loving to an extremely risk averse cocoa exporter. An identical range was used by Rolfo 
(1980) so results make for an interesting comparison with his work.  
 When γ = ∞, the second term drops out in equation (4) and we get the pure revenue hedge 
(Rolfo, 1980; Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990). The pure revenue hedge (with infinite risk 
aversion), for quadratic utility is 0.44 as shown in Table 3.4. When we allow less than infinite risk 
aversion, for all levels of γ larger than 0.001, the revenue hedge is also 0.44.  In comparison, 
Rolfo (1980) finds using quadratic utility that the optimal revenue hedge ratios for Ghana, is 0.6 
for γ larger than 0.001 so our results are only slightly different from Rolfo’s. 
 Since we are using data after the 1978 structural break, the market analyzed is somewhat 
different.  Therefore we expect to find similar but not identical results as Rolfo (1980) when we 
use the quadratic utility function. From Table 3.4, the optimal hedge ratios do not vary much with 
γ, but similar to the results reported by Rolfo, and Outtara, Schroeder, and Sorenson (1990) they 
drop precipitously at lower levels of γ. Here the threshold value of γ is 0.0001. The conclusion 
96 
  
from the analysis using quadratic utility and zero transactions costs is that Ghana would benefit 
from hedging cocoa export revenue albeit to a small extent. 
Table 3.5 Comparisons of Optimal Hedge Ratios (MVH) for Ghana at a Value of the Risk 
parameter (γ) of 4 and at Different Transactions Costs Using Quadratic Utility 
 
Transaction costs ($ b) given γ=4 Ghana
0 0.44
10 0.38
20 -1
50 -1
100 -1
200 -1
 
 
 When transactions costs are incorporated optimal hedge ratios decline. Transactions costs 
alter optimal hedge ratios at a γ or CRRA of 4 corresponding to a CARA of 0.000005 using 
quadratic utility. A CCRA of 4 employed as it is typical in the literature for risk analysis. From 
Table 3.5, between $0 and $10 dollars/ton, the optimal hedge ratio shrinks from 0.44 to 0.38.  
This represents a 6 percentage point decline in the optimal hedge ratio. At any value of the 
transactions cost greater than $10, the optimal hedge ratio is negative meaning a long hedge is 
superior to a short hedge. A negative (long) hedge ratio means that the cocoa marketing board 
should go long both the commodity and the futures contract. However, this is impractical here 
since it amounts to speculation and increases risk.  
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Table 3.6 Optimal Hedge Ratios at Different Values of CRRA for NE 2004 Utility for Different 
Values of the CRRA risk Parameter for Ghana 
 
Risk Aversion b=0
Parameter (γ) Ghana
∞ 0.31
1000 0.31
100 0.31
10 0.31
4 0.31
3 0.31
2 0.31
1 0.31
0.1 0.31
0.01 0.31
0.001 0.31
0.0001 0.31
0.00001 0.1
0.0000001 -0.96
0.00000001 -19.96
Cash hedge 0.819
Pure Revenue Hedge 0.31
 
 
 When we compute optimal hedge ratios with the more realistic CRRA utility function 
(Nelson and Escalante, 2004), the results differ from the quadratic utility. From Table 3.6, the 
pure revenue hedge ratio (infinite risk aversion) for Ghana, computed at zero transactions costs 
using the more representative Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility function is 0.31. This is 
comparable to the finding of Rolfo for log utility (which is also a CRRA utility function but has a 
fixed CRRA γ value of 1). The fact that the CRRA utility functions (Nelson and Escalante, 2004) 
display smaller hedge ratios than the quadratic utility is to be expected because the former also 
displays decreasing absolute risk prudence which means it is less sensitive to risk (Chen, Wang, 
and Mittelhammer, 2006). Insensitivity to risk implies that as revenues increase COCOBOD is 
unlikely to seek more protection from risk because its preferences are not sensitive to risk. An 
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agent with quadratic utility is more sensitive to risk as revenues increase and will seek more 
protection from risk leading to higher optimal hedge ratios. Since the CRRA utility represents 
more believable preference we put more weight on these results. 
 The optimal hedge ratios using CRRA utility are fairly constant at different values of the 
risk parameter (γ). From Table 3.6, the optimal hedge ratio for Ghana remains constant at 0.31 at 
CRRA risk parameter value (γ) greater than 0.0000001, then turns negative. The constant optimal 
hedge ratio for values for the range of γ between infinity and 0.0000001 indicates that the 
speculative component of the hedge is inconsequential. For the range of γ greater than 0.0000001 
or for risk lovers, the speculative part of the hedge dominates so the hedger is net long (Outarra, 
Schroeder, and Sorenson, 1990). A long hedge here implies speculation which is not desirable 
here given the risk minimization objective outlined in COCOBOD’s UMP. 
 Similar to the results of the quadratic utility analysis, the optimal hedge declines 
monotonically at risk parameter value (γ) of 4 for fairly reasonable values of transactions cost ($0 
to $100 per ton).  For Ghana, transactions costs appear to exert considerable influence on optimal 
hedge ratios using the Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility function although the transaction cost 
effect is less dramatic than in the quadratic utility case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
  
Figure 3.3 OHR at different Transaction Costs, γ = 4 and using  NE  2004 Utility 
 
 
 
Data Source: Export Revenue data were obtained from the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. 
 From Figure 3.3, between $0 and $100/ton, the hedge ratio declines from a value of 0.31 
(the pure revenue hedge) to 0.2. Ultimately, beyond a transaction cost/ton of $350 hedging is a 
moot question because the transaction costs per ton are simply too high. 
 Transaction costs have many components not all of which has been accounted for by 
brokerage fees.  In particular for a SSA country such as Ghana, there are large hidden costs such 
as the cost of educating the would-be risk managers at the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board about 
futures markets and contracts as well as other financial requirements for using future contracts all 
of which will increase the relevant feasible range of transactions contracts. Still it is unlikely that 
the transactions costs paid per contract will be as high as $350.  The results using Nelson and 
Escalante’s (2004) utility suggest optimal hedge ratios for the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 
remain positive even after transactions costs are considered. Based on these results, limited use of 
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the futures market appears to be optimal for Ghana when we take transaction costs into account 
given reasonable values of the risk parameter. 
    
3.6 CONCLUSIONS  
SSA cocoa producers such as Ghana are typically exposed to both production and price risk 
which results in revenue risk.  Revenue risk can be managed using futures contracts.  However, 
the use of futures markets incorporates costs that may outweigh the benefits. This analysis 
investigated the effect of transaction costs and risk tolerance on the optimal hedge using cocoa 
revenue data from Ghana and both quadratic utility and Nelson and Escalante’s (2004) CRRA 
utility functions. Results confirm Rolfo’s (1980) finding that the optimal hedge is increasing in 
the risk parameter for both utility functions for the range of data used. However, using quadratic 
utility and reasonable values of the risk parameter, we obtain very small positive hedge ratios 
without considering transaction costs which quickly disappear with modest transaction costs
 In comparison using the Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility function which is a more 
believable representation of preferences, we obtain small positive values for the optimal hedge 
ratios even when transactions costs are considered. Since the optimal hedge ratio is the solution of 
a utility maximization problem, Ghana’s use of the futures market is superior to the no hedging 
situation.  
Despite the potential benefits identified using the more representative Nelson and Escalante 
(2004) utility function, the results indicate that Ghana should hedge considerably less than full 
output when facing pure price risk.  When faced with revenue risk, Ghana should hedge 
significantly less than when facing pure price risk. Finally when transactions costs are considered, 
the scope for hedging is reduced even more.  
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3.7 EXTENSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 Although this paper does not focus on the enhanced reputation dimension of the benefits 
of hedging revenue risk, following Malone (2005), it would be interesting to simulate the 
reduction in the probability of sovereign default risk that a smoothened cocoa export revenue risk 
from hedging implies. The reduction in cost of sovereign borrowing from different degrees of 
income smoothing due to hedging should also provide valuable information to policy-makers. 
 More detailed analysis of the effect of transportation costs on the optimal hedge ratios and 
on the utility from hedging revenue risk will also provide pertinent information for Ghanaian 
policy makers. Incorporation of the utility derived from reduced borrowing rates and decreased 
probability of sovereign default on loans (that hedging entails) into the utility maximization 
problem of the cocoa-exporting SSA sovereign are also useful candidates for further research.  
 Another interesting line for research is to investigate why the NYBOT contracts do not 
have mechanisms to recognize whatever is special about Ghana cocoa.  Is the answer simply 
because it is not cost effective from the NYBOT perspective since Ghana cocoa can sell for more 
to European buyers than top Americans because Europe is closer? Or is the quality of Ghana 
cocoa just not valuable to the American cocoa processor and chocolate producers? 
 Further research could also investigate if the structure of domestic cocoa marketing in 
Ghana is likely to change from a focus on production exclusively for export to a focus on 
processing the produced cocoa and whether that change will reduce risks for COCOBOD making 
risk management less of an issue. In particular, as Prebisch and Singer (1954) have argued, terms 
of trade decline over time for primary products like cocoa so it might be a good idea for the 
producers of primary products to move up the chain into processing. It can plausibly be argued 
that since comparative advantage is dynamic not static by investing in technology, Ghana might 
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actually secure a comparative advantage in processing cocoa over time which can help it process 
more cocoa beans. If Ghana substantially increases the proportion of cocoa beans processed 
domestically then hedging against output price variation of cocoa beans becomes less relevant. 
However, increased processing will not eliminate marketing problems completely for the 
COCOBOD.  New risks associated with developing and maintaining an effective supply chain 
and new challenges of competing with established firms in the final product market will emerge. 
Further, as processing increases, returns and risk from the complete supply chain operations 
become important, and pricing of the input cocoa beans to both support producer well-being and 
provide sufficient returns with an acceptable risk will be relevant.   
 The move into processing in part will depend on whether the value added per ton of 
processing more than compensates for the lost premiums per ton selling raw cocoa beans. 
Preliminary research by Pinnamang-Tutu and Armah (2011), suggests that the value added from 
processing seems to be increasing over time and in turn, the tonnage processed by Ghana is 
increasing slowly.  Nevertheless, at the moment 80% of total production is still exported.  
Research that identifies what combination of total beans produced should be exported and what 
percentage should be processed in Ghana will be valuable information for Ghanaian cocoa policy 
makers seeking to maximize sovereign welfare from cocoa export revenue. 
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CONCLUSIONS TO THE DISSERTATION 
 This three essay dissertation evaluated the usefulness of marketing-based and aid-based 
strategies in spurring growth and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The 
conclusion from Essay 1 that conditional on political stability, aid contributes to growth in SSA 
has important consequences for aid policy and should stimulate further research into the factors 
that help to achieve and sustain stability in SSA. Essay 1 also helped to resolve the aid-growth 
debate for SSA; Aid helps in SSA countries conditional on political stability.  Further, the 
marginal effect of growth with respect to aid for SSA was found to be non-trivial so aid was 
confirmed as a viable strategy for growth promotion in SSA. 
  Essay 2, the first of two papers evaluating the applicability of market-based strategies to 
SSA, determined whether the cocoa futures market is efficient as efficiency is a desirable 
condition for using futures as a market-based risk management strategy. Revenue risk-
management with futures markets was shown to be a viable strategy to hedge cocoa revenue risk 
because cocoa futures markets were found to be unbiased and efficient in both short and long 
runs. Further, costs due to risk premiums are negligible.  Although private agents can make 
money in the short run using information from historical time series, the money made is irrelevant 
on a risk-adjusted basis. The futures market thus satisfies the sufficient condition for 
informational efficiency and does not contain a risk premium.  This means the cost of using the 
futures markets either through non-accurate hedges or through payments made as compensation 
by short hedgers to speculators is insignificant. It is therefore feasible to use cocoa futures to 
minimize revenue risk.  
  Essay 3 investigates the usefulness of hedging with futures markets for the Ghanaian 
cocoa exporter in a utility maximizing framework.  In contrast to previous research, I allow for 
non-zero basis, and a more realistic utility function (which displays risk vulnerability and 
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decreasing absolute risk prudence). Using annual data on prices and production, optimal hedge 
ratios were then determined by solving the utility maximization problem facing the Ghanaian 
cocoa exporter.  Hedge ratios for Ghana are considerably less than one, but positive for relevant 
ranges of risk parameters and transaction costs.  As a consequence hedging appears to be utility 
improving, but the amount hedged is only a small proportion of total production.  
In conclusion, I note that while Essay 1 establishes aid as a credible development strategy 
albeit only in politically stable SSA countries, Essay 2 suggests that market risk management with 
futures markets is a viable development strategy for SSA. Essay 3 however concluded that 
although hedging is potentially feasible, the magnitude of production protected using futures 
contracts will be small. Aid, political stability and market strategies thus emerge as 
complementary tools to spur growth in SSA. 
 In particular, if we conceptualize foreign aid as part of total capital inflow and the use of 
futures markets as smoothing the capital inflow in some way, then hedging and foreign aid work 
in concert to promote growth contingent on political stability. While aid increases the flow of 
capital, hedging minimizes its variability resulting in robust growth as long as political conditions 
are favorable to turn capital into wealth. 
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Appendix A 
 
Millennium Development 
Goals 
Targets 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty  
 and hunger. 
i. Reduce by half the number of people living on less than 
$1/day. 
 ii. Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from 
 hunger. 
2. Achieve universal primary   
 education. 
i. Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of 
primary schooling 
3. Promote gender equality  
 & empower women. 
i. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
school education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 
2015. 
4. Reduce child mortality. 
 
i. Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children  
 under 5. 
5. Improve maternal health. i. Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio. 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS 
 malaria and other 
 major diseases. 
i. Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
ii. Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases.  
7. Ensure Environmental 
 sustainability. 
i. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies & programs, reverse loss of environmental 
resources. 
ii. Reduce by 1/2 the number of people w/o sustainable 
access to safe drinking water. 
iii. Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers by 2020. 
8. Develop a global  
 partnership for 
 development. 
i. Develop further an open rule based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system; Includes a 
commitment to good governance, poverty reduction both 
nationally and internationally.  Address the special needs of 
the least developed countries; includes tariffs and quota free 
access for LDC exports; enhanced debt relief for the heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official 
bilateral debt; and more generous development assistance 
(ODA) for countries committed to poverty reduction. 
ii. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and 
small Island developing States. 
iii. In cooperation with developing countries, develop, and 
implement strategies that with generate employment for the 
youth. 
iv. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies provide 
access to affordable and essential drugs in developing 
countries. 
v. In cooperation with the private sector, make available new 
technology especially in IT &communication. 
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Appendix B   
 Ghana’s Unique Domestic Cocoa Supply Chain 
 
Cocoa Bean Production 
(Smallholder Farmers, CRIG, SPU, CSSVDCU) 
 
 
Collection and Bagging 
(LBCs) 
 
 
Quality Assurance 
(QCD) 
 
 
Haulage of Cocoa 
(Cocoa Haulers Association of Ghana) 
 
 
Warehousing and Sales 
(CMC) 
 
 
Local Sales  External Sales 
  (Domestic Processors)         (External Buyers) 
 
LBC: Licensed Buying Agent 
SPU: Seed Production Unit 
CRIG: Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana 
CCVDCU: Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Control Unit 
CMC: Cocoa Marketing Company 
Source: Pinnamang-Tutu (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enabling Environment 
(COCOBOD/Government
) 
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Appendix C 
The Closed-form Optimal Solution for the Optimal Hedge When Basis Risk is Absent 
Here P= Pf so we can use that information to solve the utility function in (A.1) for h, the optimal 
hedge position. 
(A.1)  Max  2 2[ ( )] {[ ( ) [ ( )]}f f fE PQ h P f b E PQ h P f b E PQ h P f b           . 
A closed form solution to (8) can be obtained if we assume no basis risk (i.e., assuming Pf = P) 
and is included in this appendix. When we allow for basis risk a closed form solution is difficult 
to obtain but a search procedure similar to that employed by Rolfo (1980) can be developed to 
determine h and by implication the optimal hedge ratio.  The search procedure is discussed in 
more detail in the text and is the procedure used to generate our results because it is more 
practical to assume non-zero basis risk.  Assuming no basis risk so that Pf = P, we can expand the 
last term in (A.1) to get (A.2) 
 (A.2) 2[ ( ) [ ]]fE PQ h P f b E PQ hb    
 
= 2( ( ))R R h   
= 2 2 2 2 2( ) [ ] 2 ( ( ) ( )E P Q PQ hE PQ P f h E P f     . 
 Let 2 2( )h E P f = 
fP
 2 so we have (A.3), 
(A.3) 2( ( )))R R h = 
2 2 2 2( ) [ ] 2 ( ( )E P Q PQ hE PQ P f h   
fP
 2. 
To solve for h we need only consider terms that contain h in (A.3). Expanding the last two terms 
in (A.3) by adding and subtracting f and μQ, we obtain (A.4)  
(A.4)  2( ( ))R R h = 
2 2 2 ({ }{ }( ))Pf Q Qh hE P f f Q P f        , 
where μQ is the mean of output. Simplifying this expression, we arrive ate (A.5) 
(A.5)   2( ( ))R R h  = 
2 2
Pfh   -2hE ({P-f}
 2
{Q-μQ}) + 2hC fP
2 
+ 2hf E ({P-f}{Q-μQ}).  
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Let E({P-f}{Q-μQ}) = covariance (P,Q) = ρ σpf σQ where ρ is the correlation coefficient between P 
and Q, and σpf and σQ are respectively the standard deviation of P (= Pf) and Q. So now we have 
(A.6),  
(A.6)  2( ( ))R R h  = h
2
 
fP
 2 -2hE ({P-f} 2{Q-μQ}) - 2hμQ 
2
Pf
 
- 2hf ρσpf σQ. 
The maximization problem now becomes 
(A.7) Max 2 2 2 2[ ( )] ( {[ 2 [( ) { }f Pf QE PQ h P f b E h hE P f Q         - 2hμQ 
2
Pf
 
- 2hf 
ρσpf σQ).   
The futures position, h, is the solution of the optimization problem in (A.7) and is given by (A.8), 
(A.8)  h = [2 γ E({P-f}2{Q-μQ})] / [2 γ σpf
2
- 2b
2] + [2 γ f ρ 
fP
  σQ + μQ fP
2] / [2 γ 
fP
 2-2b] –[2bE(PQ)] / [2 γ 
fP
 2-2b].  
Assuming normality, the third and fourth moments of the distribution of price, revenue and 
quantity are all zero so h is given by 
(A.9)    h = [2 γ f ρ σpf σQ + μQ fP
2] / [2 γ 
fP
 2-2b] – [2b E (PQ)] / [2 γ 
fP
 2-2b].  
Given normality, and in the absence of transactions costs, b = 0 and we get  
(A.10)   h =  [f ρ σQ / fP ] + μQ . 
The hedge ratio H = h / μQ so from (A.10), we get (A.11) 
(A.11)   H = ρ (f /
fP
 ) (σQ / μQ) + 1.   
Therefore if ρ is negative, both the correlation between Q and P and transactions costs (b) will 
tend to reduce the optimal hedge ratio. Note that equation (A.11) has a very intuitive 
interpretation because (f /
fP
 ) is the inverse of the coefficient of variation of futures price at 
expiration and ( Q / Q ) is the coefficient of variation of stochastic output (Mackinnon, 1967). 
Clearly if   < 0 so that price and production are negatively related, then the optimal hedge ratio 
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is less than unity. This result is similar to the conclusions drawn by Mackinnon (1967) and Rolfo 
(1980): in the presence of production risk and no transactions costs the optimal hedge ratio is less 
than unity. The more negatively correlated are price and output, the smaller the optimal hedge 
ratio. If in addition, price and production are not correlated then we get (A.12), 
(A.12)   = 0 and H = 1 in an unbiased futures market.  
The cocoa exporter should fully hedge output. The result H = 1 is the usual case described by 
Hieronymus (1971) for a merchant faced only with price risk and has support in the literature (see 
Ederington, 1971; Rolfo, 1980 and McKinnon, 1967). If transactions costs are not zero then we 
get (A.13), 
  (A.13)  H  =  [2 γ f ρ σpf σQ + μQ   fP ] / [2 γ fP
2
-2b] μQ   –   [2bE (PQ)] / μQ [2 γ fP
2
-
2b].  
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